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Abstract
Caught-in-Translation (CiT): Detecting Cross-level Inconsistency Attacks
in Network Functions Virtualization
Sudershan Lakshmanan Thirunavukkarasu
By providing network functions through software running on standard hardware, Net-
work Functions Virtualization (NFV) brings many benefits, such as increased agility and
flexibility with reduced costs, as well as additional security concerns. Although existing
works have examined various security issues of NFV, such as vulnerabilities in VNF soft-
ware and DoS, there has been little effort on a security issue that is intrinsic to NFV, i.e.,
as an NFV environment typically involves multiple abstraction levels, the inconsistency
that may arise between different levels can potentially be exploited for security attacks.
Existing solutions mostly focus on verification, which is after the fact and cannot prevent
irreversible damages. Further adding to the complexity, the different abstraction levels can
be managed by multiple service providers, which may render the data required for verifi-
cation inaccessible. Moreover, many existing solutions are limited to a single abstraction
level and disregard the multi-level nature of NFV.
In this work, we propose the first NFV deployment model to capture the deployment
aspects of NFV at different abstraction levels, which is essential for an in-depth study
of the inconsistencies between such levels. We then present concrete attack scenarios in
which the inconsistencies are exploited to attack the network functions in a stealthy manner.
Based on the deployment model, we study the feasibility of detecting the inconsistencies
through verification. Furthermore, by drawing an analogy between multi-level NFV events
and natural languages, we propose a Neural Machine Translation (NMT)-based detection
iii
approach, namely, Caught-in-Translation (CiT), to detect cross-level inconsistency attacks
in NFV. Specifically, we first extract event sequences from different abstraction levels of an
NFV stack. We then leverage the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to translate the event
sequences from one level to another. Finally, we apply both similarity metric and Siamese
neural network to compare the translated event sequences with the actual sequences to
detect attacks. We integrate CiT into OpenStack/Tacker, and evaluate its performance using
both real and synthetic data. Experimental results show that CiT outperforms traditional
anomaly detection and provides an accurate, efficient, and robust solution for detecting
inconsistency attacks in NFV.
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Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) has emerged as one of the main technology pillars
of 5G networks [35, 112]; for instance, 60% of network service providers will be adopting
NFV by 2021 [80] and the NFV market size is projected to grow from $12.9B in 2019 to
$36.3B by 2024 [34]. The main benefit of NFV comes from its power in decoupling the
network functions, such as firewall or intrusion detection, from dedicated and proprietary
hardware appliances. By providing network functions through software-based Virtual Net-
work Functions (VNFs) running on top of standard hardware infrastructures, NFV makes
it possible for providers to deploy dynamic, agile, scalable, and cost-efficient network ser-
vices.
1.1 Inconsistencies in an NFV Stack
Despite such advantages, the increased complexity of an NFV stack means the attack sur-
face of NFV environments will be significantly larger than that of traditional networks,
leading to novel security vulnerabilities and threats [30]. Existing works [26, 41, 83, 110]
have addressed various security threats in NFV (e.g., vulnerabilities in VNFs, vulnerabili-
ties due to orchestration and management complexities, and vulnerabilities resulting from
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the lack of interoperability) and proposed corresponding solutions (e.g., hypervisor intro-
spection, secure zoning, and image signing).
However, a security issue that is intrinsic to NFV has received little attention, i.e., as
NFV environments typically involve several levels of abstraction, the inconsistency be-
tween those levels may arise due to the lack of proper synchronization between man-
agement and orchestration components, which can be exploited by malicious adversaries
for security attacks. Although the inconsistency threats have been investigated in other
contexts such as cloud and SDN [46], [109], it has only received limited attention in
NFV [23, 82, 83, 94] and there lacks an in-depth study about how such inconsistencies
may be instantiated and exploited based on concrete deployment of NFV, and how such
inconsistencies may be modeled and identified based on existing data in NFV. Addition-
ally, such attacks may cause severe security concerns, such as unauthorized modifica-
tions of Service Function Chains (SFCs), network eavesdropping, and DDoS, as evidenced
by real-world vulnerabilities (e.g., [56–58, 71, 72, 74, 75]) and reported in recent studies
(e.g., [23, 24, 41, 83, 90, 94, 110]). Therefore, to ensure the secure deployment of NFV, it is
essential to detect such inconsistency attacks (in fact, our solution is able to detect many of
the above-mentioned real-world vulnerabilities, as shown later in this work).
To that end, most of the existing works (e.g., [25,27,28,47,48,50,99,102,113,114]) ver-
ify the state (e.g., configurations) of the NFV system to detect such inconsistency attacks,
which suffers from the following limitations. First, those solutions are mostly retroac-
tive in nature as they can only conduct the inconsistency verification after the fact and
with a delay (e.g., time to verify). Therefore, those solutions cannot prevent irreversible
damages (e.g., information leakage and DoS). Second, most of those approaches (e.g.,
[25, 28, 50, 102, 114]) heavily rely on the access to lower-level configurational data (e.g.,
network flow rules, flow classifiers, etc.). However, the practicality of those works could
be limited when multiple providers are involved, as accessing the required lower-level data
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may become infeasible [98]. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
works considers the implication of all abstraction levels in the NFV stack, whereas most
only focus on part of the NFV stack (e.g., the physical infrastructure [47], the virtual in-
frastructure [48], or Service Function Chaining (SFC) [27, 99, 102, 113, 114]).
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this work, we observe the gap between what is needed for understanding the inconsisten-
cies (i.e., detailed information about the NFV deployment) and what is currently available
in the ETSI NFV reference architecture [17]. The observation leads us to devise a novel
NFV deployment model based on studying existing NFV deployment in open source plat-
forms. Our deployment model complements the ETSI NFV architecture with details about
all the critical components of an NFV environment, their relationships, and their levels
of abstraction. Our deployment model enables us to present concrete attack scenarios in
which the inconsistency vulnerabilities are exploited to attack NFV in a stealthy manner.
We validate our model and attacks through implementation based on a real NFV testbed,
and presenting a feasibility study on the verification solution by gathering information re-
quired for identifying the consistency.
As a solution for detecting such inconsistencies in an NFV stack, we propose a novel
approach, namely, Caught in Translation (CiT), to translate event sequences between dif-
ferent levels of an NFV stack and detect cross-level inconsistency attacks. More specifi-
cally, we first study the cross-level mapping of NFV events and generate embeddings for
both events and event sequences. Second, we devise an NMT-based technique (tested with
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [32], Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [14], and simple
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [3]) to translate event sequences between different lev-
els of NFV. Finally, we apply both Siamese neural network [55] and traditional similarity
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metric [91] to quantify the similarity between a translated event sequence and the actual
event sequence in order to detect any inconsistencies. We implement CiT and integrate it
into OpenStack/Tacker [98], a popular choice for NFV deployment on cloud management
platform. Through extensive experiments with both real and synthetic data, we demon-
strate the accuracy and efficiency of our approach. Finally, we discuss several use-cases to
demonstrate the practicality of CiT.
1.3 Contributions
In summary, the main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, our NFV deployment model is the first effort to capture
how NFV is deployed in the real world based on open source platforms, and we
believe such a model may see many other applications.
2. The attack scenarios demonstrate both the feasibility and the severity of inconsistency-
based security threats, which could draw more attention to this issue and provide
insights to its mitigation. Our study about the information required for identifying
inconsistencies serves as a foundation for developing security verification solutions
to detect such threats.
3. To the best of our knowledge, CiT is the first event-based approach to detect inconsis-
tency attacks in an NFV stack. In contrast to most after-the-fact approaches, CiT can
catch malicious events at runtime before such events cause any potentially irrecover-
able damages, such as the leakage of sensitive information or denial of service.
4. CiT demonstrates the potential of a translation-based detection approach. First, CiT
is shown to outperform traditional anomaly-based detection in terms of accuracy.
Second, the comparison of the three variations of CiT shows that translation can
4
significantly improve the detection accuracy. Finally, the translation capability may
have other applications in NFV, such as providing translated events at a level where
the access to actual events is prohibited (e.g., by a different provider).
5. The practicality of CiT is demonstrated through its integration into OpenStack/-
Tacker. Its accuracy and efficiency are evaluated through extensive experiments using
both real and synthetic NFV datasets, and its robustness is examined through train-
ing and testing with data collected from different systems, and capturing anomalous
events triggered by real world bugs and errors. Additionally, we discuss the extension
of CiT to other NFV platforms (e.g., OSM [78], and OPNFV [77]).
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the ETSI NFV
architecture and introduces our NFV deployment model. Chapter 3 presents the attack
scenarios and studies the feasibility of consistency verification. Chapter 4 introduces our
translation-based inconsistency detection system. Chapter 5 details the implementation and
provides the experimental results. Chapter 6 provides more discussions. Chapter 7 reviews
the related work and Chapter 8 details contributions to other projects. Chapter 9 elaborates




In this chapter, we first review the ETSI NFV architecture and explain what additional
information is needed to understand the inconsistencies through a motivating example. We
then introduce our multi-level NFV deployment model.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 The ETSI NFV Reference Architecture
ETSI [19] introduced the NFV reference architecture as represented in Figure 1, to en-
able dynamic deployment and management of VNF instances and the relations between
them [19]. Figure 1 shows the NFV reference architecture from ETSI (the callouts are not
a part of ETSI NFV architecture and will be explained in Chapter 2.2). The architecture in-
cludes three main blocks, namely, Virtual Network Functions (VNFs), NFV Infrastructure
(NFVI), and NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO). First, VNFs provide a high-
level representation of network functions. Second, NFVI represents the cloud infrastruc-
ture that provides basic compute, network and storage capabilities. Third, MANO supports
dynamically managing and orchestrating the lifecycle of physical and virtual resources,
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which is further divided into three managerial components, Virtual Infrastructure Manager
(VIM), Virtual Network Function Manager (VNFM), and Network Function Virtualization
Orchestrator (NFVO), to complete the entire deployment process. The Operating Support
System/Business Support System (OSS/BSS) is considered as an independent module sup-
ported by MANO.
Table 1 lists the main abbreviations we use in this thesis.
Acronym Full Form Acronym Full Form
CP Connection Point PPG Port Pair Group
EMS Element Management System RNN Recurrent Neural Network
FC Flow Classifier SDN Software Defined Networking
GRU Gated Recurrent Unit SDN-C SDN Controller
LSTM Long Short-term Memory SFC Service Function Chain
MANO Management and Orchestration SVM Support Vector Machine
NFP Network Forwarding Path TFIDF Term Frequency-inverse Document Frequency
NFV Network Function Virtualization VDU Virtual Deployment Unit
NFVI Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure VIM Virtual Infrastructure Manager
NFVO Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator VM Virtual Machine
NMT Neural Machine Translation VNF Virtual Network Function
NS Network Service VNFD VNF Descriptor
NSD Network Service Descriptor VNFFG VNF Forwarding Graph
OOV Out-of-Vocabulary VNFFGD VNFFG Descriptor
OvS Open vSwitch VNFM VNF Manager
Table 1: Main acronyms used in this thesis
Virtual Infrastructure Manager
VIM manages physical resources and the virtualized pool of compute, storage and network
resources in NFVI. VIM interacts with NFVO and SDN controller to facilitate network
service orchestration and traffic steering respectively. VIM’s northbound interface facil-
itates orchestration and management module of NFV. The southbound interface interacts
with the hypervisor and network controller to implement virtualization and traffic steering
respectively.
Virtual Network Function Manager
VNFM is responsible for performing the life-cycle operations (for e.g., instantiate, scale,


































Figure 1: The ETSI NFV reference architecture [19]
Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator
NFVO handles the complete deployment process of an NS. The two main functionalities
of NFVO are: (i) Resource Orchestration, where it orchestrates the resources under the
control of multiple VIMs and (ii) Service Orchestration, where it coordinates with multiple
VNFMs to create and manage an end-to-end NS. Hence, NFVO is often referred as “the
brain of NFV”.
Hence, MANO can be considered as the most critical block inside this architecture in
terms of its role in inducing inconsistencies. For example, if the three managerial com-
ponents are in accordance with each other for every change inside the NFV environment,
inconsistency can certainly be avoided up to a degree. However, that is not the case accord-
ing to the current implementation methodologies. Therefore, it is important to understand
the role of each managerial component before exploring the inconsistency problem.
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2.1.2 NFV Service Models
The following NFV use cases are proposed by ETSI which corresponds to the existing
cloud service models (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) [18].
NFV Infrastructure as a Service (NFVIaaS)
This model enables cloud service providers to lease the infrastructure from another service
provider (e.g., a Network Service Provider) to deploy their virtual NSs. Network service
provider shall be able to integrate their VNF instances running on the leased infrastructure
into an end-to-end network service instance on their own NFV infrastructure.
Virtual Network Platform as a Service (VNPaaS)
In this case, the service provider builds a generic virtual platform which is used by an
enterprise to deploy their own network services. This model allows the enterprises to have
complete administrative privileges over the network service.
Virtual Network Function as a Service (VNFaaS)
VNFaaS is in accordance with Software as a Service (SaaS) model where a VNF is a
network service provider’s application and an enterprise (end-user) becomes the consumer
of the network service. The end-user is only able to configure the VNFs without being able
to control or manage the underlying platform.
2.1.3 The Cloud Architecture
NIST defines cloud architecture into two distinct layers [59]. The Management Layer
comprises of cloud management operations (e.g., create network), which assists tenants
to manage their virtual environment. The Infrastructure Layer includes underlying imple-
mentations (e.g., VXLAN tagging, flow table management, traffic steering), which is the
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key to implement multi-tenancy. SDN can be integrated into the cloud architecture to fur-













































Figure 2: The NIST cloud model [59] depicting the two-layer view of a multi-tenant virtu-
alized infrastructure in cloud
2.2 Motivating Example
To illustrate what might be missing in the ETSI NFV architecture when it comes to study-
ing the inconsistencies, Figure 3 shows a simple example of inconsistency. First, the NS
specification (top of the figure) shows that Bob has specified a virtual firewall (vFw) with
two Virtual Deployment Units (VDUs), i.e., VDU2 with pfSense for routing and fire-
walling (the rule shows that any SSH requests should be rejected), and VDU3 with Snort
for IDS. Second, the corresponding NS instance depicts the changing state of VDU2 before
and after an attack is launched by another user, Alice. By exploiting a VM hopping vul-
nerability (e.g., CVE-2015-3456 (Venom), CVE-2015-7835, and CVE-2018-10853), Alice
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gains control of VDU2 and modifies its pfSense rule to allow SSH requests to the Web
server. Importantly, such a change made by Alice on VDU2 will not be reflected at the
higher level (in the VNF Descriptor), which leads to a stealthy attack caused by the incon-































































Figure 3: An inconsistency between the NS specification and instance
To model this attack using the ETSI architecture, we revisit Figure 1. As the callouts
show, the attack involves the following NFV deployment details missing in the ETSI archi-
tecture.
- The mappings between VDUs and VNFs, NS instance and VNF, NS instance and
NFVI are all absent from the ETSI architecture, e.g., the mapping between the virtual
firewall descriptor and the two VDUs is essential to understand the inconsistency in
our example.
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- The mapping between the management and implementation layers of clouds [59] is
also missing in the ETSI model, e.g., the mapping between Bob’s VM and VDU2
allows us to link the attack step 1 and step 2.
- Other details like the traffic steering related to the dependencies between the man-
agerial components and the corresponding virtual resources are also missing.
To complement the ETSI architecture with such missing details, the next chapter de-
vises an NFV deployment model.
2.3 The NFV Deployment Model
This chapter proposes a multilevel deployment model for NFV environments. We first
provide an overview and then detail each level of the model.
2.3.1 Overview
Our NFV deployment model is based on the NFV deployment of several popular open
source platforms including Open Networking Automation Platform (ONAP) [61], Tacker [64],
OpenStack [64], and OpenDaylight [62]. We extract the operational dependencies between
managerial components (i.e., NFVO, VNFM, VIM, and SDN-C) and functional elements
(e.g., VNF, VM, SFC, and virtual switches). We separate the NFV stack into four levels
as follows. The first level is based on the common deployment aspects from both ONAP
and Tacker, i.e., NFVO and VNFM collaborate together to process descriptors and perform
high-level management of VNFs and their connectivity. The second and third levels are
based on NIST’s cloud architecture [59], i.e., the management layer for cloud management
operations and the implementation layer for underlying implementations.
Figure 4 presents our multilevel NFV deployment model (middle) with the mapping to
the ETSI NFV reference architecture (left) and our motivating example (right). Specifically,
12










































































Figure 4: The multilevel NFV deployment model
1. The Service Orchestration (L1) level is the entry point for NFV users to input their
intended design specifications of network services (NS). The managerial components
at this level are VNFM and NFVO, which control the onboarding of VNF, and NS
based on user specifications.
2. The Resource Management (L2) level instantiates the specifications. The managerial
component at this level is VIM, which receives requests from NFVO and deploys the
corresponding NS instance accordingly.
3. The Virtual Infrastructure (L3) level incorporates the virtual compute, storage, and
network resource pool. The SDN controller (SDN-C) plays a critical role in manag-
ing network traffic steering at this level.
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4. Finally, the Physical Infrastructure (L4) level depicts all physical resources to com-
plete an end-to-end NFV stack.
2.3.2 L1: Service Orchestration Level
L1 includes the deployment components such as NFVO, VNFM, NSD, VNF, and EMS.
Two key NFV managerial components at L1 are NFVO and VNFM, which manage NSs in
the form of catalogs such as network service descriptor (NSD). NSD can include other de-
scriptors, such as VNF descriptors (VNFD) and VNF forwarding graph descriptors (VNF-
FGD). Descriptors provide all necessary network service specifications and implementation
information in structured templates for orchestration. For example, the traffic steering is
defined in VNFFGD; the incoming network traffic would first pass flow classifiers (FC)
before being forwarded to a specific network function path (NFP). An NFP connects VNFs
with connection points (CPs) using virtual links.
To deploy an NS instance, an NFV user specifies the descriptors as inputs for NFVO.
After NFVO validates the technical accuracy of such inputs, NFVO and VNFM inform
VIM to allocate the underlying resources to implement the NS. NFVO manages the VNFFG
(network topology), whereas VNFM with Element Management System (EMS) performs
high-level management of the individual VNFs based on users’ specifications, e.g., the
logical mapping between VDUs and VNFs. However, the implementation details at lower
levels are not reflected in VNFM. We place VNFs at the same level of VNFM because of
this operational dependency.
Example 1. Tenant Bob wants to deploy an NS with three VNFs to steer traffic to two
destinations. The right side of L1 in Figure 4 shows this NS is deployed using four de-
scriptors. The NSD for this instance is the composition of VNFFG1D, vRtrD, vFwD, and
vDPID. The lower part of this sub-figure bridges the descriptors with the implementation.
For example, vFw at this level includes the interpretation of its corresponding descriptor
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vFwD and the instance identifiers of VDU2 and VDU3 from the lower level. This logical
mapping helps to understand the deviation between vFwD and VDU2 should any inconsis-
tencies occur. Logically, NFP1 contains the sequential order of connection points (e.g.,
CP:vRtr) to chain all three VNFs. FC1 classifies all HTTP traffic to NFP1, while FC2
sends the management traffic through NFP2.
2.3.3 L2: Resource Management Level
L2 contains virtual resources such as VDUs, subnets, SFC, network ports, etc., depicting
how the NFV virtual resources are created and managed inside the cloud environment. VIM
is directly responsible for provisioning, interconnecting and decommissioning these virtual
resources contained in an NFVI-PoP domain (an NFVI instance). VDUs at L2 follow a
many-to-one relationship with the VNFs from L1 and a one-to-one logical mapping with
the VMs from the lower level. VNFFGs from L1 are instantiated as service function chains
(SFCs; also referred to as port chains). SFC is a sequence of port pair groups, which consist
of one or more port pairs.
Once the resource allocation request is received from NFVO, VIM allocates the com-
pute, storage and network resources corresponding to the given descriptors. Then, the
virtual resources, such as VDUs, subnets, network ports, routers, service chains, are in-
stantiated to build an NS. Although VIM can be considered as a part of both L2 and L3,
the management operations are executed by cloud tenants from L2 through VIM to directly
manage the virtual resources. Hence, VIM is considered as a part of L2 in our model.
Example 2. Once VIM receives the resource creation request from NFVO, it creates the
deployment units (e.g., VDU1) as shown on L2. These VDUs are then configured based on
NSD. For example, the mapping of vFw to VDU2 and VDU3 is configured to allow HTTP
traffic and block SSH traffic. After the creation and configuration of VNFs, the network
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paths are created as defined in VNFFGD. These function paths are implemented as port-
chains nfp1-chain and nfp2-chain with the respective flow-classifier instances fc1
and fc2. By definition, nfp1-chain is an ordered list of port-pair-groups (CPs at L1)
PPG1, PPG2 and PPG3 corresponding to the virtual instances VDU1, VDU2 and VDU3,
respectively.
2.3.4 L3: Virtual Infrastructure Level
L3 includes SDN-C and the virtual networking elements, such as virtual switches, VLANs,
VxLANs, virtual routers, flow tables, virtual bridges, and the corresponding interfaces.
SDN-C is the management element inside this level (we follow the most widely adopted
use case in the SDN usage specification [20] to place SDN controller at this level for provid-
ing network connectivity). Flow-tables form the fundamental elements for network traffic
steering. These flow-tables are populated with flow-rules, which depict the forwarding be-
havior of the SFC. Once the service chains are created, the corresponding traffic flows for
each chain are deployed in the virtual switches for traffic steering through VMs. The de-
ployment of traffic flow rules is carried out by the SDN-C; this is another reason for us to
place SDN-C at this level.
Listing 2.1: Flow-rule that forwards HTTP traffic to vRtr VNF
c o o k i e =0 x794188fe368fe901 , d u r a t i o n =1108281.174 s , t a b l e =0 , n _ p a c k e t
s =0 , n _ b y t e s =0 , p r i o r i t y =30 , t cp , i n _ p o r t =" qvo6094f47a −3 f " , nw_src=
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 0 . 1 1 , nw_dst = 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 0 / 3 2 , a c t i o n s = group : 1
Example 3. Listing 2.1 shows the flow-rule that classifies and forwards the HTTP traffic
through vRtr to the web server. table0 acts as an FC for the SFC. Each flow-rule has a
match criteria followed by the action that is to be performed for the matched traffic. In case
of nfp1-chain, simple match criteria is to select all HTTP packets originating from the
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in_port: qvo6094f47a-3f with the nw_src as 192.168.100.11 and the destination
as 192.168.100.100/32. Then the action is to forward the matched packets to vRtr
VNF, which is denoted as group:1 referencing the VNF’s port-pair-group. The traffic
is then forwarded to group:2 (vFw) and group:3 (vDPI) before it reaches the actual
destination.
2.3.5 L4: Physical Infrastructure Level
This level includes all the physical entities (e.g., COTS servers as controller and compute
nodes, and physical network functions (PNFs)) that are involved in the NFV stack. The
actors involved at this level are typically the physical infrastructure operators or facility
managers who also represent the managerial components. The model does not include
many details at this level for the sake of clarity.
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Chapter 3
Inconsistencies in NFV Stack
In this chapter, we first discuss inconsistencies in NFV and explore potential attacks for
exploiting the inconsistencies at different levels. We then provide two concrete attack sce-
narios to validate our multi-level NFV deployment model.
3.1 Overview
The inconsistency between the NS specification and instance as discussed in our motivating
example (Chapter 2.2) is only a special case. Despite the fact that NFVO is considered as
the “brain” of an NFV environment, the other managerial components can operate at each
level autonomously, which is referred to as the “split-brain” issue in the literature [21].
For example, VIM and SDN-C can manipulate virtual resources and virtual network freely
without going through NFVO. Such autonomous management is intentional in order to
effectively manage multiple domains in a single NFV environment (e.g., there can be mul-
tiple VIMs managing many NFVI Points of Presence (NFVI-PoP)). However, the lack of
synchronization is not intended [82], and it can lead to inconsistencies whenever the states
of functional elements managed by two different managerial components differ from each
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other. Additionally, in order to facilitate VNFs to mimic the promiscuous mode of tradi-
tional networking devices and to route traffic, port security (i.e., packet filtering on a port)
is disabled for the VNF instances during NFV deployment by default. The downside of this
feature is that, there is no network isolation between tenants who are on the same network.
These fundamental design properties of NFV greatly facilitate the attacks that lead to sig-
nificant discrepancies in the overall system. Aftermost, the NFV client who is dependent
on the underlying levels is unaware of the contemporary functionality of his own network
service. These inconsistencies can potentially lead to unexpected behaviors or network
errors, security threats [83, 94] including some stealthy attacks as presented later in this
chapter.
Therefore, the inconsistency may potentially arise between any managerial components
and their functional elements inside an NFV environment. To that end, our multilevel
NFV deployment model provides a foundation for analyzing potential inconsistencies, as
it sufficiently captures the relationships between different levels of components in an NFV
environment. For example, the inconsistencies between the management level and the
implementation level of cloud [46] and SDN [109] could be mapped to L2 and L3, while
the inconsistencies between user specification and the actual deployment could be captured
by comparing L1 to the lower levels.
Next, we investigate potential attacks exploiting the cross-level inconsistencies based
on our deployment model shown in Figure 4 and a concrete implementation based on Open-
Stack Tacker [64] and OpenDaylight (ODL) [62] (which will be detailed in Chapter 5). We
will focus on possible attacks originated at L2 and L3, respectively, which could cause
inconsistencies with the user specifications given at L1.
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3.2 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary can be a malicious cloud tenant, an admin operator, or an
external attacker who controls a virtual machine (e.g., via malware infection) with system
privilege. The adversary is assumed to share part of the infrastructure (e.g., compute hosts
and physical network) with the victim. We also assume that the cloud infrastructure can
have vulnerabilities that the adversaries may identify and exploit. We do not assume the
adversaries can compromise the managerial elements, and we do not assume the adversaries
can compromise SDN controllers or switches.
3.3 Attacks targeting the consistency property
This chapter explains the possible attack cases which can lead the NFV stack to an incon-
sistent state.
3.3.1 Attacks at L2
By targeting the managerial component in this level (VIM) and the other functional ele-
ments such as VDU, port-chain, security groups etc., an attacker gains a variety of oppor-
tunities to render the NFV system to an inconsistent state.
The potential attacks originated at this level could lead to the modification of VDUs,
port-chain, security groups, etc., which could all lead to an inconsistent state of the NFV
system. We discuss several possibilities to achieve such attacks in the following.
– Through VIM, a malicious cloud admin, a cloud operator colluding with an external
attacker, or a malicious cloud user exploiting a privilege escalation vulnerability will
be able to modify the functional elements of another user’s NS. Over time, OpenStack
has seen several privilege escalation and sensitive data exposure vulnerabilities, such
20
as OSSA-2016-005 and OSSA-2017-004 [68]. By exploiting such vulnerabilities, an
attacker can perform many unauthorized operations, such as updating a service chain
by including a malicious VNF, for the system to reach an inconsistent state.
– As illustrated in our motivating example, an attacker can also take over the control
of a VM through exploiting a hypervisor vulnerability and then modifying either its
configurations or the traffic flow to lead to an inconsistent state in which the attacker’s
actions at L2 are not reflected at L1 causing a stealthy attack.
3.3.2 Attacks at L3
Existing security threats in SDN, such as malware infection, topology poisoning [33], con-
trol plane saturation [95], and state manipulation attacks [107], can be employed to manip-
ulate the traffic flow in L3. We discuss some possible attacks at this level as follows.
– An attacker can send crafted packets to the SDN controller to externally trigger un-
desirable events that lead to inconsistencies. For example, by enabling/disabling
the network interfaces on a host, the attacker can trigger host-related events such as
HOST_JOIN, HOST_LEAVE, etc.
– An attacker can compromise a virtual switch and program it to modify traffic flows
to cause inconsistencies. For example, a critical vulnerability (CVE-2018-1078 [63])
in ODL can be exploited to cause uncontrolled communication between VNFs by
programming the switch to reconnect to the network upon new flow update events.
3.4 Attack Scenarios
This chapter introduces two real attack scenarios which were implemented in our NFV
testbed (introduced in Chapter 5) highlighting the feasibility of an NFV stack to be led to
an inconsistent state.
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3.4.1 Attack Scenario 1
Using our testbed, we have implemented a concrete attack that targets the integrity of a

































Figure 5: An implemented attack at L2 causing inconsistency between the path specifica-
tion VNFFG1:NFP1 and its instance nfp1-chain
In Figure 5, Bob is a network service provider serving enterprise NFV clients who
happens to share the physical infrastructure with a malicious tenant Alice. The red dashed
line shows a compromised service chain instance, nfp1-chain, which is modified by
Alice to include a malicious VNF. However, as our test has shown, such a modification
at L2 will not be reflected at L1, leading to an inconsistent state of the NFV stack and a
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Figure 6: An illustration of the attack timeline when Alice modifies Bob’s port-chain
nfp1-chain by adding a malicious mVDU at L2
More specifically, Figure 6 shows the attack timeline. The port-chain instance (nfp1-chain)
of NFP1 consists of three port-pair-groups corresponding to the three VNFs at t−i time. Al-
ice at tk could perform the aforementioned attack to execute the neutron port-chain-update
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command which would update nfp1-chain by adding the port-pair-group of a malicious
VNF mVDU. Upon the execution of the neutron port-chain-update command, the flow-rules
will be updated in the virtual switches for vDPI to forward the traffic further to mVDU as
opposed to the path definition in the VNFFGD element of L1. To this end, the mVDU VNF
is added as a hop in Bob’s port-chain allowing Alice to have unauthorized access to any
traffic flowing through NFP1 without being noticed.
3.4.2 Attack Scenario 2
The second concrete attack targets the flow-tables at L3 for causing inconsistencies between
L3 and the upper levels. When the network topology gets updated, the SDN controller will
install new flow-rules in the virtual switches to reflect the changes. To manipulate the
flow-tables at L3, an attacker can trigger a virtual switch reconciliation (a functionality to
ensure that switches properly reflect intended controller configurations after restarts) by
sending crafted network packets during a network topology update. This would cause the
old flow-rules to be installed instead of the new flows. Therefore, the traffic will be steered
as specified by the old flow definition contravening the topology update.
Specifically, assuming the end user (NFV Client) updates NS’s topology by changing
its VNFFG1 definition at L1 to add vDPI to NFP2, which will redirect the management
server’s traffic through vDPI for further analysis. Upon the update, the corresponding port-
chain (nfp2-chain) and flow-rules in the virtual switches must be updated at L2 and L3,
respectively. Meanwhile, an attacker triggers a SWITCH_LEAVE event by continuously
resetting TCP sessions [107] between compute1_vswitch and the controller. When
the switch reconnects, the old flow-rules are re-installed as a consequence of the node-
reconciliation vulnerability, leading the traffic of NFP2 to be forwarded to the management
server directly without passing vDPI. However, L1 and L2 are not aware of this change in
the actual traffic flow, leading the NFV system into an inconsistent state.
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In addition to the attacks presented in this chapter, there might be many other ways
for exploiting the cross-level inconsistencies in an NFV stack (e.g., attacking the flow-
classifier component). To address this issue, we provide a feasibility study on identifying
inconsistencies through verification.
3.5 Feasibility of Consistency Verification
Security verification using formal methods [44,94,109] or graph-based approaches [38] has
seen applications in clouds and SDN, and it can also provide a viable solution for detecting
the aforementioned inconsistencies in NFV. A key challenge is to understand what data
needs to be collected from which component of an NFV stack in order to identify the
inconsistencies. Based on our multilevel deployment model, we provide some preliminary
























































Figure 7: An example showing the feasibility of verifying inconsistencies based on data
extracted from different levels
Specifically, Figure 7 shows an excerpt of the data sources within each level of our
deployment model.
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– L1: the descriptors at this level represent users’ requirements, which provide the
baseline for verifying consistency. For example, NSD defines the path specification
nfp1-chain with three VNFs (vRtr, vFw and vDPI) and the corresponding net-
work path.
– L2: the information related to VNFs and SFCs can be extracted from VIM through
several sources, such as Heat, Nova, Neutron databases, and the VDUs (e.g., VNF
configurations and logs). The order of VNFs in a chain is preserved as the order of
records in Neutron database, while the number of VNFs in a chain is corresponding to
the number of records under the same chain_id. In our example, chain_id 50adae26
contains four VNFs instead of three as defined in NSD. The inconsistency created by
mVDU could be detected by comparing those data.
– L3: flow-tables from the virtual switches contain the information related to the for-
warding behavior of NS. The highlighted flow-rule is the maliciously added flow,
which forwards the traffic to mVDU (group 4 in the rule), and also shows the incon-
sistency w.r.t. NSD.
More generally, the user-defined NS specification at L1 and the NS deployment related-
data at L2 and L3 represent the current system state and will comprise the main inputs to





Based on the NFV deployment model introduced in Chapter 2, we present Caught-in-
Translation (CiT), an LSTM-based sequence translation system for detecting inconsistency












































































Figure 8: The motivating example
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We present a motivating example to further highlight existing challenges in cross-level
inconsistency detection for NFV and motivate towards our solution. The left side of Fig-
ure 8 shows the simplified NFV stack of a tenant Bob, which consists of an VNF level
with three VNFs (Virtual Router, Virtual Firewall, and Virtual DPI) and a NFVI level with
their corresponding Virtual Deployment Units (VDUs). For brevity, other virtual compo-
nents, e.g., virtual machines, are omitted from the figure. Knowing that an adversary Eve
could potentially inject a malicious VDU (mVDU) into Bob’s network directly at the NFVI
level, without causing any noticeable changes to the VNF level 1, Bob is concerned with
the following question: “Is my service function chain (SFC) properly deployed at the lower
levels?”
The right side of Figure 8 demonstrates the main ideas of our approach to detect incon-
sistency attacks. Specifically, a user-level operation Create VNFFG (i.e., creating a VNF
forwarding graph) triggers two sequences of events at the VNF-level (in Tacker) and the
NFVI level (in Neutron), respectively. Our key idea is to first translate the lower (Neutron)
event sequence to the upper (Tacker) level, and then compare the translated event sequence
to the actual Tacker event sequence, such that any inconsistency, such as the one shown
in the figure (i.e., the Neutron event updateflowrules does not correspond to any Tacker
event), can be detected. However, as shown at the bottom of the figure, a challenge here is
that the same Tacker event sequence may correspond to many different Neutron event se-
quences, depending on the nature of events and the specification of the VNFs (e.g., a VNF
may require multiple VDUs, and a VNF may have the autoscaling capabilities). There-
fore, there does not exist a trivial mapping between the event sequences which would allow
translation using simple rules. We will tackle this challenge using an NMT-based approach
in the remainder of the thesis.
1For instance, by exploiting existing vulnerabilities CVE-2015-3456 [56], CVE-2015-7835 [57], or CVE-
2018-10853 [58] in a specific way [96].
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4.2 Key Ideas
In contrast to most existing works which mainly verify NFV configurations, our first idea
is to take an event-based approach, i.e., examining and comparing events that occur at dif-
ferent levels of an NFV stack which correspond to the same user-level operation. The main
advantage of relying on events instead of configurations is that we can potentially catch
malicious events before they cause any irreversible damages. The events could be inter-
cepted and checked (e.g., similar approaches exist for cloud platforms [4, 70]) to prevent
malicious events from materializing their negative impact, e.g., injecting a malicious VNF
into a Service Function Chain (SFC) to eavesdrop traffic flowing through the chain, or
deleting legitimate VNFs from the chain to cause a denial of service. To that end, the main
challenge is to detect the fact that certain events could cause inconsistencies between NFV
configurations at different levels, before such inconsistencies are materialized. A straight-
forward solution could be to apply a standard anomaly-based detection mechanism, which
will first train a model of normal events by considering event sequences at all levels of
the NFV stack as the training data, and then utilize this model to identify any anomalous
events causing inconsistencies. However, as evidenced by our experimental results, such
an approach will be outperformed by our solution.
Our second idea is that we can draw an analogy between comparing event sequences
at different NFV levels and translating sentences between different natural languages. As
a result, we can leverage existing Neural Machine Translation (NMT) techniques designed
for the latter to detect inconsistency attacks in NFV. Specifically, inside an NFV stack,
a user-level operation, such as creating a VNF, will typically trigger an event sequence at
each lower level. The fact that those lower-level event sequences all correspond to the same
user operation means that their relationship is similar to the equivalence between sentences
written in different natural languages. Thus, by leveraging this similarity to natural lan-
guages, we would be able to “translate” event sequences from one level to another, and
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subsequently detect any inconsistencies by comparing the translated sequence to the ac-
tual one. Even though translation-based solutions (e.g., [15, 36, 85, 93, 105, 108, 115]) have
already shown promising results in other domains (e.g., binary code similarity, network
traffic anomaly, and Android malware detection), to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first effort to apply such an idea in the context of NFV.
4.3 CiT Overview
This chapter first provides an overview of CiT, followed by the detailed methodologies of
its major components.
Figure 9: CiT System Overview
Figure 9 depicts how CiT prepares the data and trains the neural network models (train-
ing phase), and how it applies the trained models to first translate event sequences from




This phase (top of Figure 9) mainly consists of the following three steps. First, CiT extracts
events from all levels of the NFV stack, constructs sequences of events per level, and gen-
erates the embeddings of those event sequences (as explained in Chapter 4.4). Second, the
NMT model [40] and the neural network similarity learning model [55] are trained based
on the embeddings (as detailed in Chapter 4.5 and Chapter 4.6, respectively). Finally, the
trained models are updated through retraining when any substantial change is made to the
NFV system (e.g., major service updates which may potentially introduce new event types).
4.3.2 Detection Phase
This phase (bottom of Figure 9) mainly consists of the following steps. First, CiT generates
embeddings for event sequences at both the evaluated level (from which inconsistency
attacks are to be detected) and the reference level (to which the evaluated level will be
compared). The next two steps will apply the trained models to translate and compare
the event sequence from the evaluated level to the reference level in order to detect any
inconsistency attacks. However, to support various use cases (see Chapter 6), CiT couples
translation and detection in three different ways as follows.
- CiTts: This variation of CiT first translates an embedded event sequence at the eval-
uated level into another embedded event sequence at the reference level, and then
compares the similarities between those two embedded event sequences using neu-
ral network similarity learning (e.g., Siamese [55]). Finally, the similarity score is
compared to a pre-defined threshold value to determine whether an attack has been
detected.
- CiTtm: This variation first performs a similar translation step as CiTts, and then com-
pares the event sequences using a traditional similarity metric (e.g., Manhattan dis-
tance [1, 91]) to detect any inconsistency.
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- CiTs: This variation skips the translation step, and directly applies neural network
similarity learning (e.g., Siamese [55]) on the collection of embedded event se-
quences from both levels to detect any inconsistency.
Finally, the resource-level inconsistencies are detected by generating and comparing TOSCA
templates. We further elaborate on our methodology as follows.
4.4 Data Preparation and Event Embedding Generation
This chapter describes how CiT processes the raw data extracted from an NFV stack to
construct event sequences and generate the embeddings (i.e., numerical representation) of
those event sequences to support translation and detection.
4.4.1 Data Preparation
The main challenges in preparing NFV data for training are as follows.
- To build the training datasets correctly, we need to first understand the causal depen-
dencies between events at different levels of the NFV stack as well as the mapping
between event sequences across different levels.2 This is challenging due to the com-
plexity and the multi-level nature of the NFV stack.
- Raw events (either gathered from NFV service logs or intercepted at runtime using
middleware plugins) typically contain many implementation specific details (e.g.,
platform-specific APIs) and parameters (e.g., request/resource IDs). Some of the
non-essential details in such raw data, if fed directly into the training modules, could
cause the Out-of-Vocabulary (OOV) challenge [11], a well-known problem in NMT.
Therefore, the raw data must be carefully processed in order to avoid the OOV issue
2Note that such understanding is only sufficient for preparing the training data and will not be exhaustive
enough to be directly applied for actual translation.
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Figure 10: An example of causal dependencies between events in Tacker/OpenStack ser-
vices
while preserving all the essential details (e.g., parameters) such that events belong-
ing to the same sequence can still be identified even if they arrive out of order or
interleaved.
- Unlike in NMT where models are trained once using large text corpora (e.g., Word-
Net [103] and Wiki) and there exist pre-trained models which can be reused (e.g.,
GloVe [84] or fastText [5]), we are the first to apply such techniques in the context of
NFV, and therefore, we need to build our own domain specific corpus related to NFV
events and train our models from scratch.
To overcome the first challenge, we studied NFV documentations and implementation
details at different levels of the NFV stack. We have also deployed various network func-
tions in our NFV testbed, and then collected and analyzed the logs to learn events and
their order of occurrences within and across different levels using timestamps and resource
parameters.
Example 4. Figure 10 shows an excerpt of the causal dependencies between different
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events of various Tacker/OpenStack services, such as Tacker [98] (which is the VNFM in
Figure 4), Heat [64] (which is the service orchestration engine), Neutron [64] (which is the
network service), and Nova [64] (which is the compute service). The black labels indicate
the timestamps of the events, and the dotted lines show the link between the events at differ-
ent levels. The flow of events starts with a user-level operation (create vnf at the timestamp
18:40:47.240), followed by a sequence of events in Tacker. After the _create_stack event
in Tacker, the stack create event is triggered in Heat at the timestamp 18:40:49.649, fol-
lowed by a sequence of events in Heat. Later, as consequences of those events in Heat, the
create port, create flavor and create server events are observed in the Neutron and Nova
services, respectively. In the end, after the stack create complete event in Heat, Tacker
finally generates the _create_vfn_post event to complete the VNF creation.
To address the second challenge, our data preparation step first extracts the relevant
events from different levels and aggregates those events into sequences corresponding to
the same user-level operation based on their parameters, such as the resource ID and project
ID, and timestamps. Afterwards, it strips out the implementation specific details and pa-
rameters from the sequences to avoid the out-of-vocabulary (OOV) problem, while keeping
essential information such as the events’ names before event embedding.
Example 5. Figure 11 shows an example of Tacker log records (top) and the correspond-
ing processed sequences of events and extracted parameters (bottom). From the raw data,
all events that correspond to the same user-level operation create vnf are identified, and
classified into the following three stages to build a corresponding sequence of events: the
initialization stage (i.e., _create_vnf_pre and _make_vnf_dict), the execution/creation stage
(i.e., _create_vnf ), and the confirmation stage (i.e., _create_vnf_post).
In addition, even when the event sequences are consistent between all levels, finer-
grained inconsistencies may still occur at the level of resource allocation (e.g., the im-
plemented size of the memory is less than what is specified). Thus, our data preparation
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Figure 11: Example Tacker log entries and the output of data pre-processing (event se-
quences and corresponding parameters)
step also outputs the required parameters to generate the user-level specifications (e.g., as
TOSCA templates [60]) to further support resource-level inconsistency detection (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.6.4). Finally, the output of our data preparation step is an NFV data
corpus ready to be fed into the training modules (which addresses the third challenge).
4.4.2 Event Embedding Generation
After building the data corpus, CiT generates event embedding similarly as generating
word embedding [42] in NMT. The event embedding provides numerical feature vectors to
capture the contextual meaning of events in the input corpus. CiT leverages the skip-gram
model of word2vec [53] to generate event embedding, which is denoted as a multidimen-
sional vector W. Specifically, CiT performs tokenization by assigning a unique index to
each event, which is simply an integer ID(i) for this event. Then for each event i, the word
embedding model generates the ith line of W. At the end of this step, we obtain the embed-
dings of all events in our vocabulary, i.e., all distinct event types. We illustrate the results
of our event embedding model using t-SNE [45] in Chapter 5.2.5.
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Example 6. The embedding of the event createvnf (in Figure 11) is generated using
word2vec by learning the meaning from the corpus (i.e., the input event sequences). The
embedding of this event is a fixed length (e.g., 200) array which contains digitized features,
e.g., 〈−0.794841945,−0.719301224 − 0.445498794,−0.859628499, ..., 〉. We will utilize
such embeddings in the translation step.
4.5 Neural Machine Translation
This chapter details how CiT translates embedded event sequences between different levels
of an NFV stack by leveraging neural machine translation (NMT), particularly long short-
term memory (LSTM) [32]. We first present some background on LSTM and then describe
our translation approach.
4.5.1 Background on LSTM
The long short-term memory (LSTM) [32] is an artificial recurrent neural network that sup-
ports sequence-to-sequence learning (Seq2Seq) [97], a mechanism for training machine
learning models to convert text sequences from one language (e.g., English) to another
(e.g., French) by capturing the meaning of those sentences using fixed-length embeddings.
Particularly, the LSTM Encoder-Decoder model [49] has been shown to achieve good per-
formance especially for long sequences [97]. Therefore, we adopt this Encoder-Decoder
model for translation since the NFV event sequences are relatively long.
4.5.2 Event Sequence Translation
CiT performs event sequence translation in three main steps: choosing hyperparameters,
training LSTM models, and translating event sequences using the models. First, the hyper-
parameters (i.e., learning parameters that play a major role in shaping and maximizing the
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performance of translation model [89]) used in LSTM for natural language translation or
other domains are not necessarily applicable to our context. Therefore, CiT evaluates dif-
ferent combinations of the hyperparameters that may affect the performance and accuracy
of the models (see Chapter 5.2.8).
Second, to train the LSTM model, CiT constructs pairs of event sequences at two dif-
ferent levels that correspond to the same user-level operation. For instance, a sequence of
normal events corresponding to a specific operation (e.g., Create VNF) at the VNF level is
provided as the input to LSTM, with the corresponding normal sequence of events related
to the same operation but at the NFVI level as the reference. Similarly, we train LSTM
models for each pair of levels in the NFV stack. Finally, CiT applies the trained LSTM
models to translate event sequences from each evaluated level to the corresponding refer-
ence level in the NFV stack in order to facilitate the next step of inconsistency detection.
Figure 12: An example of Seq2Seq translation using the LSTM Encoder-Decoder model
for an event sequence from the VNF level to the NFVI level
Example 7. Figure 12 shows an example of Seq2Seq translation using a trained LSTM
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Encoder-Decoder model. The input event sequence (INPUT) from the VNF level is trans-
lated to an output event sequence (OUTPUT) at the NFVI level. Both INPUT and OUTPUT
correspond to the same NFV user-level operation, Create VNF. More specifically, the event
embeddings of INPUT are fed into the LSTM Encoder. Each LSTM cell in the Encoder
accepts an event, i, from INPUT and produces a corresponding hidden state, hi. The last
hidden state of Encoder, hT , is the sequence embedding of INPUT and is denoted as con-
text vector (cT). The Decoder, which is initialized with an arbitrary start event, TARGET,
takes cT as input and translates the next event (e.g., creatingstack). The translated event is
then appended to both OUTPUT and TARGET. This translation process is repeated until
the Decoder generates the end-event (〈EOS〉).
4.6 Neural Network-based Inconsistency Detection
This chapter describes how CiT detects inconsistency attacks by comparing the similarities
between the translated and actual event sequences using both neural network similarity
learning (e.g., Siamese [55]) and similarity metric (e.g, Manhattan Distance [91]).
4.6.1 Background
The Siamese network [55] is a deep learning model that has been applied to find similari-
ties between two comparable inputs. Specifically, Siamese network employs two identical
deep learning models that share the same weights of parameters; where each model takes
encoded inputs and generates its semantic representation as outputs. On the other hand,
Manhattan distance [91] is a similarity metric that can be applied to evaluate the distance
of two inputs and is mainly used with high dimensional data (such as ours).
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4.6.2 Training
To facilitate the training of Siamese networks for detection, we prepare two kinds of train-
ing datasets: (i) the sequence of events at the same level (e.g., Tacker), and (ii) the sequence
of events at two different levels (e.g., Tacker and Heat). For each pair of sequences, we also
provide a ground truth similarity score based on whether the two sequences correspond to
the same user-level operation; if so, a pair is called a consistent pair; otherwise, it is an
inconsistent pair. The training process will vary depending on which variation, i.e., CiTts,
CiTtm, or CiTs (as mentioned in Chapter 4.3) of our detection technique is involved. First,
since CiTts translates the embedded event sequence from the evaluated level to the refer-
ence level and then compares the translated result to the embedded event sequence at the
reference level, the Siamese network is trained using the first kind of dataset (i.e., event se-
quences at the same level). Second, no training is needed for CiTtm as it compares using a
similarity metric (e.g., Manhattan distance) instead of Siamese network. Third, since CiTs
directly applies Siamese network on the embedded event sequences at both the evaluated
and reference levels, the Siamese network is trained using the second kind of dataset (i.e.,
event sequences at two different levels).
Example 8. Figure 13 shows the training of the Siamese network with a pair of event
sequences S1 and S2. The sequences S1 and S2 correspond to the same user-level operation,
Create VNF, but with certain differences (highlighted). Since both event sequences are
related to the same operation, this is a consistent pair and its ground truth similarity score is
1. First, the events in S1 and S2 are embedded and fed into two LSTM models (LSTM1 and
LSTM2), respectively. The LSTM networks then generate the event sequence embedding
for S1 and S2 as hidden state vectors, hT 1 and hT 2, respectively. As shown on the top of the
figure, the similarity score is calculated as the negative exponent of the Manhattan distance
calculated using hT 1 and hT 2. The training of the Siamese network will continue until the
loss function of the trained model reaches the minimum value. The parameters involved in
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Figure 13: An example of training the Siamese Manhattan Network with NFV event se-
quences
Siamese training is further explained in Chapter 5.2.6.
4.6.3 Inconsistency Detection
CiT detects inconsistency attacks at two different levels of granularity: event-level (i.e.,
within the execution of one user-level operation) and workflow-level (i.e., during the ex-
ecution of a sequence of user-level operations). Figure 14 demonstrates how CiT detects
both kinds of attacks as follows.
Event-Level Detection. The first scenario is based on a real-world inconsistency that oc-
curred in our NFV testbed, which is diagnosed to be related to a version mismatch between
Neutron and OvS switches. In this scenario, CiT detects an event-level inconsistency attack
(highlighted with dashed red lines in Figure 14), where there is a missing sub-sequence of
events related to a user-level operation. More specifically, when the user level operation
E3 is performed at the reference level (RL), a series of corresponding events denoted as e3
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should be executed at the evaluated level (EL) (Step 1). However, due to the aforemen-
tioned version mismatch issue, the OvS flow rules are not updated, resulting in missing
events. To detect this inconsistency, CiT first translates e3 (EL) to the corresponding event
sequence E3′ (RL) (Step 2). When the translation module hits the unknown part of the event
sequence e3 (missing events in our case), it will repeat the last known event, which can be
observed as the repetitive events 89 in the translated event sequence. This inconsistency
is detected by the Siamese network through comparing the translated E3′ to the actual E3
(Step 3.1).
Figure 14: An example of event-level and workflow-level inconsistency detection
Workflow-Level Detection. In the second scenario, CiT detects a workflow-level incon-
sistency attack (highlighted with solid red lines in Figure 14), where a malicious network
component (e.g., VDU) is stealthily added at the NFVI level without leaving any trace at
the VNF level (similar to the attack described in our motivating example in Chapter 4.1).
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In this scenario, we consider the execution of four operations (E1-E4) as a workflow. Dur-
ing Step 1, an attacker operating at the evaluated level (EL) generates an operation em that
has no corresponding operation at the reference level (RL). Note that the RL workflow
sequence contains an embedded event sequence, em (shown in red), corresponding to the
attack. In Step 2, the workflow sequence translated from EL to RL leads to the creation
of an additional event sequence (shown in red) in the translated output, with no correspon-
dence to the actual workflow. At Step 3.2, this inconsistency is detected through comparing
the event sequences of the actual workflow and the translated workflow.
4.6.4 Diff-based TOSCA Verifier
Inconsistencies may still exist after the event sequence similarity comparison as we remove
the parameter values from the raw log entries as described in Chapter 4.4. As a result,
we lose few implementation specific details, such as the technical specifications of a VNF,
applications installed inside the VNF, etc. To compensate the loss, we utilize the parameters
from service logs to generate TOSCA template that reflects the implementation details to
verify the correctness of resource allocation. TOSCA template is stored in the YAML
format that could be compared between the elements (i.e., requested resources, such as
VDUs), e.g., mem_size is an attribute that denotes the memory size of a requested VDU.
Algorithm 1: TOSCA TEMPLATE TRANSLATOR
Input: Services Logs, Tenant_ID, TOSCA Template.Default
Output: TOSCA Template.Translated
1 for log in Services Logs do
2 Tenant_ID.logs = get(Services Logs, Tenant_ID)
3 for log in Tenant_ID.logs do
4 attribute.value, element = get(log)
5 search element in TOSCA Template.Default
6 add attribute.value to TOSCA Template.element
7 return TOSCA Template.Generated
In Algorithm 1, Lines 1-2 obtain the logs that associate with the input tenant ID. The
logs belong to this tenant gets separated into element, e.g., VDU, and attribute values, e.g.,
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mem_size = 256MB in Lines 3-4. Then the element gets identified in the input default
TOSCA template and changes the attribute values into the ones obtained in Lines 5-6.
Once all the logs are processed, a TOSCA template contains lower level details, which
will be returned. Then Algorithm 2 takes the TOSCA user template and TOSCA generated
template as inputs and generate the difference from Lines 1-3. In the end, the inconsistency
between the requested resources and deployed resources will be return to the end user.
Algorithm 2: TOSCA TEMPLATE COMPARISON
Input: TOSCA UserTemplate, TOSCA GeneratedTemplate
Output: TOSCA diff
1 d = difflib.Differ() for text1, text2 in UserTemplate, GeneratedTemplate do





5.1 Implementation of NFV Testbed
To validate our deployment model and demonstrate concrete attack scenarios, we have
implemented a real NFV testbed with a telemetry NFV network service. We use Open-
Stack [64] as the VIM, which is considered as an essential cloud management solution by
96% of the CSPs, while more than 60% of the telecom operators are already using Open-
Stack for their NFV deployments [73].
OpenStack Tacker [64], an official OpenStack project for building a generic NFVM and
NFVO based on ETSI MANO Architectural framework, is integrated to deploy and operate
virtual network services on the VIM. We adopt the most widely used TOSCA [60] defini-
tion standards for defining network service descriptors. An ODL SDN controller is imple-
mented to build an OpenFlow-enabled NFV system. In our implementation, Tacker uses
OpenStack Heat [64] for VNF lifecycle management and user-defined VNF descriptors are
uploaded to the VNFM module of Tacker through Horizon/CLI. We build our testbed on a
SuperServer 6029P-WTR equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Bronze 3104 CPU @ 1.70GHz
and 128GB of RAM. Figure 15 illustrates the detailed implementation and depicts different
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deployment stages as described in Chapter 2.3.
Tacker incorporates a generic driver for service function chaining, and we use the Open-
Daylight SDN controller in our OpenFlow-enabled NFV system. OpenDaylight (ODL) [62]
is an official open source project by the Linux Foundation. A survey conducted in May

































Figure 15: A real-world NFV deployment on our testbed implemented using OpenStack
Tacker and ODL. The circled numbers indicate deployment stages: 1) Onboarding the NS
Descriptors, 2) Deploying the VNFs, 3) Configuring the VNFs and 4) Instantiating the NS
The network service instantiation workflow involves three deployment stages: 1) on-
boarding VNF descriptors (VNFDs) to VNF catalog and network service descriptor (NSD)
to NS catalog, 2) deploying the VNFs, 3) configuring the VNFs and 4) instantiating the
network service.
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5.1.1 Onboarding Network Service Descriptors
User-defined VNF descriptors are uploaded to the VNFM module of Tacker through Hori-
zon/CLI. These descriptors are stored in the VNF catalog serve as VNF deployment tem-
plates. The VNFD includes technical attributes of the incorporated VDUs, such as, com-
pute specifications (memory size, number of CPUs, image, etc.), connections points (virtual
ports) and virtual links. VNFDs are validated and stored in the Tacker database for VNF
instantiation.
For instance, the system specification of vFw may include the following properties
which are used by the VIM during deployment: host: VDU2; image: pfsense-fw; flavor:
m1.small;. The descriptor could also have network function configuration information,
placement policies, monitoring tasks and auto-healing properties. For example, a firewall
policy to allow HTTP traffic to be configured in vFw as config rule: [name: ‘allow-HTTP’;
src: ‘wan’; proto: ‘http’; family: ‘ipv4’; action: ‘accept’;].
Once VNFDs are in place, a user uploads network service descriptors to the NFVO
module of OpenStack Tacker. NSDs are validated and stored in the NS catalog of NFVO.
The network service descriptors mainly contain the topology description of all the network
services to be instantiated in the form of forwarding graph definitions. Firstly, the VNFs
belong to the network service are imported in the corresponding NSD. Then the network
paths are defined by referring the connection points of the participating VNFs. The NSD
template facilitates the service function chain implementation.
5.1.2 Instantiating the Network Service
Network service instantiation involves creating the referred VNFs followed by the deploy-
ment of service function chain. Tacker uses OpenStack Heat [65] for VNF instantiation and
termination. When the ns-create request is submitted by a user, NFVO extracts the VNFDs
and converts them to heat orchestration templates (HOTs) using the heat-translator. The
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heat templates are then passed to heat-apis to orchestrate the requested VNFs. Once the
VNFs are created, Tacker initiates the chain implementation through the sfc-driver, which
is configured to use OpenDaylight (ODL) controller for managing the virtual switches. The
SFC module gathers the network topology information from OpenStack Neutron [67] and
generates the flow-rules to be installed. The new flow-rules are transferred to ODL which
in turn updates the OpenvSwitches to route packets through VNFs.
5.1.3 NFV Testbed Components
This chapter introduces the various components in our NFV testbed corresponding to our
NFV deployment model which is introduced in Chapter 2.3.
L1 Components
Figure 16 shows the VNF catalog module of Tacker’s VNFM component where the VNFDs
are onboarded. Only the VNFDs which have passed the input validation will be listed as
available as seen in the screenshot.
The onboarded VNFDs can then be used to deploy one or more VNFs Figure 17 shows
the deployed VNFs which are in ACTIVE state. VNFS will go into ERROR state if there is
any failure in the lower level deployment. For example, if there are insufficient number of
vCPUs to create a requested VNF, the following error message will be thrown: “No valid
host was found. There are not enough hosts available”.
Similar to the VNF catalog module, Tacker comprises of a VNFFG Catalog where
the VNFFGDs are onboarded as shown in Figure 18. These VNFFGDs are then used to
deploy VNFFGs to steer traffic through the VNFs. Figure 19 shows the VNFFG Manager
component where the ACTIVE VNFFGs are listed.
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Figure 16: VNF catalog in Tacker Horizon showing a list of onboarded VNFDs
Figure 17: VNFM module in Tacker Horizon showing a list of deployed VNFs
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Figure 18: VNFFG catalog in Tacker Horizon showing a list of onboarded VNFFGDs
Figure 19: VNFFG manager module in Tacker Horizon showing a list of deployed VNFFGs
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L2 Components
Figure 20 show the screenshot of NFVO component where OpenStack has been registered
as a VIM (L2 component) which provides the virtual resources to build NFV systems.
Figure 20: OpenStack VIM
Figure 21 highlights the OpenStack system overview, whereas Figure 22 gives detailed
view of all the available virtual resources. OpenStack includes a stack of compute, storage,
networking and orchestration services to manage the virtual resources in order to facilitate
network functions virtualization.
Figure 21: OpenStack system overview
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Figure 22: OpenStack system defaults
Figure 23 lists all the OpenStack services which are deployed in our NFV testbed.
Figure 23: A list of all the OpenStack services in the NFV testbed
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L3 Components
As we have mentioned earlier, OpenFlow rules are considered as the most significant entity
in L3, since they control the traffic which is steered through the VNFs. Figure 24 shows an
excerpt of OpenFlow rules from the virtual switches deployed in our NFV testbed.
Figure 24: OpenFlow Rules corresponding to the deployed VNFFGs
5.2 Experiments
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of CiT in terms of accuracy, efficiency, ro-
bustness, and usability using both real data (obtained from a real cloud hosted at one of the
largest telecommunications vendors) and synthetic data (collected from our NFV testbed).
First, Chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 provide the implementation details and dataset description,
respectively. Chapter 5.2.4 then examines the impact of data pre-processing on out-of-
vocabulary events. Finally, Chapters 5.2.6 through 5.2.9 study the accuracy, robustness,
hyperparameter selection, and efficiency and scalability of CiT.
5.2.1 Implementation Details and Experimental Settings
In both the translation and inconsistency detection modules of CiT, we leverage the word2vec
[53] model from Genism [88] to learn event embeddings from the corpus. The embedding
vector is then fed into the embedding layer implemented based on Keras [37]. The deep
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Table 2: Dataset statistics (the gray shaded datasets are processed real data)
Dataset Training Validation Testing Total
Con. Incon. Total Con. Incon. Total Con. Incon. Total Con. Incon. Total
D1: Tacker-SFC 16,023 15,628 31,651 1,960 1,996 3,956 1,968 198 2,166 19,951 17,822 37,773
D2: Tacker-Heat 65,223 64,956 130,179 8,090 8,182 16,272 8,416 785 9,201 81,729 73,923 155,652
D3: Heat-Nova 84,952 77,415 162,367 10,660 9,636 20,296 10,574 972 11,546 106,186 88,023 194,209
D4: Heat-Neutron 65,343 62,258 127,601 8,119 7,831 15,950 8,092 785 8,877 8,1554 70,874 152,428
D5: Neutron-OvS 14,022 12,344 26,366 1,674 1,622 3,296 1,742 155 1,897 17,438 14,121 31,559
D6: Heat-Nova 64,423 37,542 101,965 8,073 4,673 12,746 8,080 466 8,546 80,576 42,681 123,257
D7: Heat-Neutron 76,209 39,992 116,201 9,578 4,947 14,525 9,491 503 9,994 95,278 45,442 140,720
D8: Neutron-OvS 187,635 67,036 254,671 23,574 8,260 31,834 23449 838 24,287 234,658 76,134 310,792
D9: Multilevel 56,758 54,625 111,383 7,078 6,845 13,923 7,061 686 7,747 70,897 62,156 133,053
D10: Multilevel 85,245 63,315 148,560 10,671 7,899 18,570 10,520 805 11,325 106,436 72,019 178,455
Total 715,833 495,111 1,210,944 89,477 61,891 151,368 89,393 6,193 95,586 894,703 563,195 1,457,898
Table 3: Statistics of the original real data (from May 2017 to March 2020)
Size # of services Duration Heat/node (entries) Nova/node (entries) Neutron/node (entries) OvS/node (entries) Total # of event types
47.5G 10 3 years 951,053 1,977,847 3,957,313 2,950,495,169 164
learning layer, e.g., LSTM, is implemented based on the Keras.layers library to learn the
event sequence embeddings. For comparison, we have also implemented GRU and RNN.
The implementation of the evaluation metrics, e.g., Loss and AUC, is based on scikit-
learn [92], a well-known ML library. The implementation of data preparation is based on
pandas [81], a data analysis library. All the modules of CiT are developed in Python 3.7.4.
In order to test and evaluate CiT, we have additionally implemented an NFV testbed.
OpenStack [64] is used as the VIM component, which manages the virtual infrastruc-
ture. OpenStack Tacker [98], an official OpenStack project for building generic VNFM
and NFVO based on the ETSI MANO architectural framework, is used to deploy virtual
network services on the VIM. All the experiments are performed on a SuperServer6029P-
WTR running the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Bronze
3104CPU @ 1.70GHz and 128GB of RAM without GPUs.
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5.2.2 Datasets
Table 2 summarizes all the datasets used in the evaluation of CiT. In total, we obtain
26,356 unique event sequences and generate 894,703 consistent pairs (i.e., two event se-
quences corresponding to the same user-level operation) and 563,195 inconsistent pairs.
The datasets follow the dependencies of services in the NFV deployment model described
in Chapter 2.3.
Real-World Data
We have collected around three years of OpenStack logs from a real cloud hosted at a
major telecommunications vendor with hundreds of users. Table 3 shows some statistics
of the original data, which we have processed to obtain the datasets D6, D7, D8, and D10
shown in Table 2 following the approach described in Chapter 4.6.2. In doing so, we
processed 47.5G of raw data and obtained 164 event types from four different services,
i.e., Heat, Nova, Neutron, and OvS. To obtain realistic testing datasets, the inconsistent
pairs in testing datasets are generated based on real-world bug patterns (detailed in Table 5,
where the inconsistency is caused by OpenStack implementation bugs) and denied event
sequences in the real data (where the inconsistency is caused by a violation). Among all
the processed raw data, 2∼8% of the data corresponds to denied user-level operations in
different services. Therefore, we inject inconsistent pairs following the similar percentage.
We split training, validation, and testing datasets into disjoint event sequences, so we can
evaluate the ability of CiT towards handling unseen event sequences. We discuss some the
challenges encountered while extracting the event sequences from individual services and
creating pairwise event sequences in Chapter 5.2.3.
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Data Generation in the NFV Testbed
We have implemented an NFV testbed to collect datasets from the NFV stack, including
from the Orchestration Level (L1) which is not present in our real data. In Table 2, datasets
D1 through D5, and D9 are obtained from the NFV testbed. We used Python scripts to
automatically generate TOSCA templates in order to deploy NFV entities, such as VNFs
and VNFFGs. In total we have deployed 31 types of VNFs (e.g., with auto-scaling policies,
dedicated subnet, floating IPs, etc.), and 7 variations of VNFFGs in order to create sufficient
diversity in the corresponding event sequences. We have also randomized a few important
parameters in the template description, such as 1) the number of virtual network ports per
VNF, 2) the number of deployment units per VNF, 3) the node Flavor specification for each
VDU, 4) the number of VNFs for each Network Forwarding Path (NFP), 5) the order of
VNFs for each NFP, 6) the flow-classifier criteria for each NFP, and 7) the number of NFPs
for each VNFFG.
5.2.3 Challenges in Processing the Real-World Data
We briefly describe the challenges encountered while extracting the event sequences from
individual services and forming pairwise event sequences.
Obtaining the Event Vocabularies. Real-world data contains more diverse event vocab-
ularies than the data we obtained from our testbed as it was generated by hundreds of real
users. To address this issue, we first went through the real-world data to understand the
structure of the logs for each service, e.g., heat-engine, then we developed regular expres-
sion to extract the event vocabularies. Data entries that do not yield any event were output
for further evaluation through constructing new regular expressions to extract the missing
event types. After several rounds of evaluation, we obtained a complete collection of event
vocabulary from the real-world data.
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Generating Event Sequences. Unlike the logs from our testbed, real data contains mixed
user-level operations that require proper separation before they can be used to extract event
sequences. To address this issue, we utilized four IDs, request_id, tenant_id, domain_id,
and stack_id (stack means a group of logs that perform similar user-level operations), to
group data into each user-level operation. Then we extracted the events and combined them
based on time stamps to form an event sequence. User-level operation became the label for
this group of data.
Generating Datasets with Ground Truth. As described in Chapter 4.6.2, in the dataset
generation, two event sequences corresponding to the same user-level operation would be
assigned with the consistent label, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the user-level operation
is missing from the real data we obtained. To address this issue, we applied the model
trained based on the data collected from our testbed to predict the user-level operation for
the real data. All the predicted labels are then validated by two domain experts to ensure
the correctness of the labeling.
5.2.4 Evaluation on Out-of-Vocabulary (OOV) Events
As we apply data pre-processing to address the OOV challenge (described in Chapter 4.4),
we evaluate its impact in two aspects, i.e., the size of vocabulary (all distinct events form a
vocabulary) and the proportion of unseen vocabulary in a new corpus, shown in Figure 25a
and Figure 25b. Both experiments are performed based on the real-world data.
We count the vocabulary size in terms of the percentage of the processed corpus (data
entries). The red line (with triangle marker) and the blue line (with cycle marker) and show
the growth of vocabulary size with or without pre-processing. This experiment is conducted
based on 951,053 Heat service log entries for three years. Since pre-processing remove
non-essential implementation details and parameters, as shown in Figure 25a, when pre-
processing is not applied to the dataset, the vocabulary size grows nearly linearly (reaching
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more than 30,000 when 100% of the corpus is used) in the percentage of the analyzed
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Figure 25: (a) The growth of vocabulary size, and (b) the proportion of unseen event types
We divide our data into two parts, with each part containing one year of the data, to
investigate the number of OOV cases, i.e., unseen vocabulary, in a later year of data. We
generate vocabulary based on the data from year 2018 to 2019, and then count the per-
centage of unseen vocabulary that does not exist in the vocabulary in the data from year
2019 to 2020. As shown in Figure 25b, the unseen vocabulary drops to less than 20%
when pre-processing is applied, whereas unseen vocabulary stays at around 80% without
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pre-processing. This result shows that the pre-processing significantly increases the cov-
erage of the vocabulary; only 20% of the data from the previous year is needed to cover
most of the event vocabulary in the latter year (while 80% would be needed without pre-
processing).
5.2.5 Event Embedding Model
Figure 26: Visualization of NFV events with t-SNE
We utilize t-SNE clustering to visualize the embeddings of different event types in our
dataset. Each token is represented as a 200-dimensional numeric vector and learned by
word2vec using the event sequences extracted from the dataset. For visualization, t-SNE
reduces the vectors to two dimensions by nearest neighbor approximation. As shown in
Figure 26, all the event types are naturally separated into multiple clusters based on their
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corresponding NFV service (For e.g., Heat, Tacker). Since, all the events related in service-
level appear together this result shows the event embedding model learns their semantic
information from the event sequences obtained from our datasets.
5.2.6 Inconsistency Detection Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the accuracy of CiT and its three variations (as described in
Chapter 4.3). First, we compare CiTs with traditional machine learning model Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [106] with the TFIDF feature set [86, 111] based on all the 10
datasets including both the real-world data and testbed data (detailed in Table 2). SVM is
known as an effective method for sequence classification in the literature [106], and TFIDF
is used to extract text features for anomaly detection and failure prediction [16]. Therefore,
we choose SVM with TFIDF feature set for comparison with our solution. Second, we
compare the three variations of CiT, i.e., CiTs, CiTtm, and CiTts in terms of accuracy.
CiTs vs. SVM
Recall that CiTs directly applies Siamese network on the embedded event sequences at two
different level for inconsistency detection. The implementation of Support Vector Machine
(SVM) model is from scikit-learn. We have evaluated the SVM model based on five kernels
in which kernel rbf performs the best followed by kernel poly, and kernel linear ranks last.
Therefore, we only present the results generated from kernel rbf with γ = 1.0 and c = 1.0,
which achieves the best AUC, as a comparison to study the discriminative power of TFIDF
features and deep learning generated features (embedding).
Model Training. In this set of experiments, training, validation and testing datasets follow
the statistics presented in Table 2. We use 10 datasets to train CiTs up to 200 epochs.
We implement early stopping [8] to avoid overfitting. We choose the loss value of the
corresponding validation dataset as the performance measure with the trigger parameter set
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to patience=3. While training the model, loss will be monitored as it is calculated after
each epoch. If there is no improvement in the loss value for 3 epochs, the training stops.
Other hyperparameters, such as the dimensions of the event embedding and the dimension
of sequence embedding, are set to 256 and 200, respectively (a more detailed study of
hyperparameters is presented in Chapter 5.2.8).
The training dataset for the SVM model is the same training dataset as CiTs. The im-
plementation of TFIDF features is from scikit-learn, which converts raw text inputs into
a matrix of TFIDF features. In the training of this experiment, we set the dimension of
the feature sets to 300 following the literature [111]. We also evaluate the performance of
SVM model under small feature dimension (max_features = 5) and large feature dimension
(max_features = 1000). Comparing to 300 dimensional TFIDF feature sets, small feature
dimension performs worse, while large feature dimension does not show stable improve-
ments. Thus, we only show the results with SVM model that is trained and tested on TFIDF
feature sets with 300 dimensions.
Inconsistency Detection Results for CiTs. We now evaluate the accuracy of CiTs using






















































Figure 29: The ROC evaluation results of CiTs based on D3
Under the evaluation with testbed datasets, the AUC value of CiTs for inconsistency
detection increases for all the datasets from D1 (AUC = 94.06%) to D5 (AUC = 100%).
Hierarchically, datasets from the higher level services, such as, D1 (Figure 27) and D2
(Figure 28), generally consist of longer event sequences, e.g., Tacker service generates
orchestration events that could be implemented with multiple lower level services; while D3
(Figure 29) to D5 (Figure 31) consist of lower level service events which generally have less
events and shorter event sequences. Notably, OvS service has only one event, flow_mods,
to implement the requested flows from Neutron service. Thus, the inconsistency detection






































Figure 31: The ROC evaluation results of CiTs based on D5
increases as the complexity of the datasets decreases due to event sequences from only
lower level services.
Under the evaluation with real data, CiTs performs well with D6 (Figure 32) and D8
(Figure 34), i.e., AUC increases from 98.27% to 100%, which leads to similar conclusion
drawn from the testbed datasets. However, the inconsistency detection evaluation with D7
(Figure 33) results in only 85.21%. This is mainly because the complexity of this dataset is
sufficiently higher due to the increased diversity of network-related events in real data, i.e.,
one event sequence from Heat service could be implemented in various ways based on user
























































































Figure 36: The ROC evaluation results of CiTs based on D10
CiTts and CiTtm since translation helps to reduce the detection complexity as explained in
Chapter 5.2.6. Nonetheless, CiTs still demonstrates good inconsistency detection ability
for both the testbed and real data, with AUC = 95.72% and 97.68%, respectively. AUC is
slightly lower in the testbed dataset because the long sequences from orchestration level
(D1 and D2), which are missing in the real dataset, increase the complexity of the dataset.
Comparison with SVM. After the models of CiTs and SVM are trained, we use the same
testing datasets to evaluate both. In general, the comparison between the two models in
terms of detecting inconsistencies shows similar results across different datasets. We can
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observe that for all datasets, the ROC curves corresponding to CiTs are closer to the left-
hand and top border than SVM models, which indicates our model generally has better
accuracy. The majority of our models yield an ROC-AUC value higher than 94%, while
SVM stays around or less than 85% for six of the 10 datasets (D1, D2, D6, D7, D9, and
D10). Comparing to SVM, the improvement of CiTs is more significant when tackling the
datasets with longer or more diversified event sequences. This observation confirms that
the embedding and deep learning algorithms are more capable of handling complicated
event sequences.
CiTs vs. CiTtm vs. CiTts
In this set of experiments, we compare the three variations of CiT to evaluate the im-
provement of accuracy (AUC) introduced by the additional translation capability of CiTtm
and CiTts. Recall that CiTts applies LSTM to translate event sequences before applying
Siamese network on the embedded event sequences at the same level for inconsistency
detection, whereas CiTtm translate event sequences but then performs inconsistency detec-
tion based on the Manhattan distance, as descried in Chapter 4.6.2. For these experiments,
we use the datasets (D1, D2, D7, and D9) for which CiTs achieves relatively lower AUC
(<96%).
The Comparison of Inconsistency Detection Results. We present the ROC curves for
the inconsistency detection based on the aforementioned four datasets for all three varia-
tions of CiT. We can observe that CiTtm, which performs inconsistency detection based on
Manhattan distance, already achieves satisfying results (AUC>94.51%). Moreover, CiTts
achieves AUC = ∼100% in three datasets (D1, D2 and D9) shown in Figure 37, 38, and
40. Notably, CiTs only achieves AUC = 85.21% in D7 (shown in Figure 39), whereas, with
the help of translation, CiTtm and CiTts achieve AUC = 94.51% and 96.03%, respectively.

















































































Figure 40: The ROC evaluation results of CiT based on the datasets D9
inconsistency detection. We can conclude that CiTts achieves the best results on all the
datasets, followed by CiTtm.
5.2.7 Robustness Evaluation
We conduct three case studies to evaluate CiT’s robustness.
Training and Testing with Different Systems
We apply the inconsistency detection models trained on our testbed dataset D9 to test the
real-world dataset D10. These two datasets are obtained from two very different systems,
with one implemented by ourselves for experimental purposes, and the other hosted at a
major telecommunications vendor with hundreds of real-world users. Therefore, this ex-
periment evaluates the robustness of CiT when trained and tested on different NFV systems.
Results. The experimental results presented in Figure 41 show that, even under this chal-
lenging scenario with two significantly different datasets (e.g., even the event types are
different), CiTs still achieves an acceptable AUC (=73.58%). Aligned with the observa-



















Figure 41: The ROC evaluation results of CiT based on D10 tested on D9
AUC to 80.03% (CiTtm) and 83.46% (CiTts), respectively. These results confirm the ro-
bustness of CiT as well as the feasibility of training CiT under a controlled environment
and then applying it to a real world NFV system.
Label Translation for Real-World Data
As highlighted in Chapter 5.2.3, our real-world data does not include the corresponding
user-level operations, which are needed as labels to form consistent and inconsistent se-
quence pairs. It is infeasible to label these manually considering that there are 8,192 unique
event sequences in total in the real-world data. Thus, we utilize the translation module of
CiT to translate the corresponding labels (user-level operations) of event sequences from
our real-world data by feeding them as testing dataset. All the translated labels are validated
by two domain experts to ensure the correctness of the labeling.
Results. The label translation results are presented in Table 4. We only show the most
commonly occurring user-level operations for each service and their corresponding accu-
racy of label translation. Our translation module is able to correctly label up to ∼94% of
the events for the Heat service followed by Nova (∼88%) and Neutron (∼75%) services.
Also, most of the events are labeled with 100% accuracy except a few. Particularly, the
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Service (%) Event Sequence Label (%) Description
Heat (∼94)
CreateServer (100) Creating a VM
CreateStack (84) Multiple operations
CreateCinderVolume (94) Creating a Cinder Volume
DeleteServer (100) Deleting a VM
DeleteStack (89) Multiple operations
Neutron (∼75)
CreatePort (100) Creating a virtual port
CreateFloatingIP (100) Creating a floating IP
UpdateFlowRuleStatus (70) Updating OvS flow rules
Nova (∼88)
CreateServer (100) Creating a VM
OSServerExternalEvents (85) Attaching a floating IP
OSSecurityGroupRules (100) Assigning a security group
Table 4: Robustness evaluation of CiT: Sequence label translation for the real-world data.
(%) indicates the percentage of correctly translated labels.
CreateStack event sequences of Heat service achieve a success rate of ∼84%. Upon inves-
tigation, we find that the real event sequences that fall under CreateStack category include
multiple create, update and delete event types since a “stack” executes multiple operations
at once. These event sequences are not correctly labeled by the model trained based on the
testbed data, since D9 contains only create event type for the label CreateStack. Further-
more, the Neutron service achieves comparatively the lowest success rate of ∼75%. The
reason is that the event sequences labeled with UpdateFlowRuleStatus in D9 contain the
Tacker service events, which are not included in dataset D10. The overall results again
confirm the robustness of CiT in applying its trained models to a different system.
Real-World Inconsistency Detection
To investigate how CiT detects real world inconsistencies, we conduct the following exper-
iment using event sequences including both real-world bugs and denied operations found
in our real data. The sequences are evaluated using CiTs trained with consistent and incon-
sistent pairs from the same level (e.g., Heat-Heat).
Results. Table 5 summarizes the results of this case study including the detailed descrip-
tion of the bugs or denied operations and their corresponding similarity scores. As we
can observe, majority of the sequences are assigned with a lower similarity score (<0.5).
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# OpenStack Implementation Error Description Severity Sim. Score
Bug#1527658 Block Device Mapping is Invalid NA 0.0038
Sequence#1 ValueError: <name>: nics are required after microversion <Version #> NA 0.0150
Bug#1653164 CinderVolume <name> Stack <name> [id] timed out Critical 0.1791
Sequence#2 NotFound: resource with id <id> not found NA 0.2003
Sequence#3 Resource CHECK failed NA 0.2395
Bug#1517355 Conflict: Port <id> is still in use High 0.2437
Sequence#4 OverQuotaClient: Quota exceeded for resources NA 0.3367
Sequence#5 Error: Volume in use NA 0.4380
Sequence#6 Resource CREATE failed: You are not authorized to use resource_types <name> NA 0.7047
Bug#1833455 Forbidden: rule <event> is disallowed by policy Medium 0.7396
Bug#1808112 Forbidden: resources. Offline rule <event> is disallowed by policy Medium 0.7970
Table 5: Robustness evaluation of CiT. Case study on real-world bugs and denied opera-
tions
Meanwhile, three of these obtain a comparatively higher similarity score (>0.7). Our inves-
tigation shows that this is mainly due to the fact that these sequences are relatively shorter
(with less events) and the bugs do not introduce significant differences to the events. For ex-
ample, the event sequence corresponding to Bug#1808112 is creatingport createport stack-
createfailed, whereas the normal sequence is creatingport createport stackcreatecomplete,
i.e., only one event is different, and both are relatively short sequences. To overcome such a
situation, CiT can be extended with a weighted similarity score measure (e.g., [9,43]) such
that more important events, e.g., stackcreatefailed (which indicates the requested operation
has failed due to an error), will carry more weight in the calculation of the similarity score
(which is considered as a future work).
5.2.8 Hyperparameter Selection
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of hyperparameters involved in training CiT. Specif-
ically, we first study the AUC and loss metrics in terms of the number of epochs using five
datasets (D1, D2, D7, D9, and D10). We then investigate the impact of (both event and
sequence) embedding dimensions and network hidden unit types based on the multilevel
datasets (D9 and D10) for the three CiT variations.
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Number of Epochs
Figure 42 and Figure 43 show the results of AUC and loss metrics for translation training
on the aforementioned five datasets, respectively. We train the translation model for 200
epochs and evaluate the model after each epoch. The curves of both AUC and loss metrics
become flat after 20 epochs for 4/5 datasets (only D7 requires around 50 epochs to become
stable, as the complexity of the dataset is higher). We can also observe that the early stop
implemented in each model stops around 20 epochs. In summary, we conclude that 20
epochs could be enough to obtain a good model in CiT.

















Figure 42: The impact of number of epochs on CiT - AUC vs. # of epochs

















Figure 43: The impact of number of epochs on CiT - Loss vs. # of epochs
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Figure 44: The impact of number of epochs on CiT - Accuracy vs # of Epoch

















Figure 45: The impact of number of epochs on CiT - Precision vs # of Epoch

















Figure 46: The impact of number of epochs on CiT - Recall vs # of Epoch
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The results of three other metrics, accuracy, precision, and recall, for translation training
process on five datasets (D1, D7, D2, D9, and D10). Align with the AUC and loss results
we observed in Figure 42 and Figure 43 the metrics results become stable around 20 epochs.
It also confirms that our model could be trained around 20 epochs with good performance
in all the metrics in all the tested datasets (i.e., both real-world and testbed datasets).
Data Split Ratio
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Figure 47: Evaluation of data separation ratio - AUC








































Figure 49: Evaluation of data separation ratio - Training Time
Tr: V: Te Loss AUC Accuracy Precision Recall
0.8: 0.1: 0.1 0.108 0.975 0.994 0.811 0.801
0.6: 0.2: 0.2 0.117 0.974 0.994 0.809 0.801
0.4: 0.3: 0.3 0.121 0.969 0.994 0.801 0.792
0.2: 0.4: 0.4 0.138 0.966 0.993 0.791 0.778
Table 6: The evaluation of data separation based on five metrics
For training, we split the training, validation and testing dataset using four different split
ratios in order to analyze the best split ratio. From the results, we can also infer that the
split ratio of 60%, 20%, and 20% for training, validation, and testing datasets, respectively,
could be considered as the optimal split ratio given the training time trade-off. Table 6
presents additional accuracy metrics to further validate the accuracy depending upon the
data separation ratio.
Event Embedding Dimensions
We study the impact of event embedding dimension (Em) in two multi-level datasets for
three CiT variations. The AUC values are presented in Table 7. We observe that, as the
event embedding dimension increases, all the models yield higher AUC values. Comparing
to D9, D10 achieves better results with all three variations. Overall, we can observe that
a higher embedding dimension generally leads to higher computational costs and longer
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training time. Considering the fact that the training is a one-time effort (until the system
undergoes major changes), users could leverage such results to choose the right trade-off
based on their requirements.
Datasets
Em D9 D10CiTs CiTtm CiTts CiTs CiTtm CiTts
50 93.14 95.04 97.72 95.42 96.01 98.16
100 93.63 96.49 98.29 95.65 96.55 98.82
150 94.88 97.70 98.81 95.92 97.13 99.59
200 95.42 98.11 99.49 96.33 97.35 99.73
250 95.72 98.78 99.67 97.68 98.36 99.92
Table 7: AUC (%) vs. event embedding dimensions (U = 256)
Sequence Embedding Dimension
We vary the sequence embedding size in terms of the number of LSTM network units (U)
and show the corresponding AUC results in Table 8. Similar to Table 7, the AUC values
of the three variations increase with the number of sequence embedding dimensions. We
conclude that embedding dimensions, both for event embedding and sequence embedding,
contribute positively to the accuracy of the models.
Datasets
U D9 D10CiTs CiTtm CiTts CiTs CiTtm CiTts
32 93.24 95.37 96.77 94.55 96.49 97.76
64 93.87 96.16 97.46 95.61 97.24 98.07
128 94.81 96.86 98.12 95.85 97.64 98.55
192 95.12 97.38 98.73 96.36 97.99 99.38
256 95.72 98.78 99.67 97.68 98.36 99.92
Table 8: AUC (%) vs. event sequences embedding dimensions (Em = 250)
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Other Deep Learning Algorithms
As the last part of the hyperparameter study, we train our approaches with different deep
learning algorithms. We conduct experiments on three types of recurrent neural network
units including LSTM, Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), and simple Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN). As shown in Table 9, LSTM outperforms both GRU and RNN, while GRU and
RNN perform similarly. Therefore, in our implementation, all the CiT approaches are
trained based on LSTM to achieve the best detection results.
Datasets
Type D9 D10CiTs CiTtm CiTts CiTs CiTtm CiTts
LSTM 95.72 98.78 99.67 97.68 98.36 99.92
GRU 93.73 95.76 94.33 93.81 95.82 96.78
RNN 92.54 93.24 93.64 93.66 94.78 96.45
Table 9: AUC (%) vs. network hidden unit types (U = 256/Em = 250)
5.2.9 Efficiency and Scalability
In this chapter, we study the efficiency and scalability of CiT by first analyzing the training
time for its three variations with five datasets (D1, D2, D7, D9, and D10), and the impact of
hyperparameters with D9 and D10. Then we investigate the testing time for both translation
and detection.
Training Time
Figure 50 shows the training time of CiT on the five datasets. For fair comparison, we
take the same number (50,000) of input pairs from each dataset. In general, CiTts (with
both LSTM and Siamese) requires the longest training time. The color separation of the
bars shows the training time for both translation and detection for this variation. However,
in practice the translation and detection models can be trained in parallel to reduce the
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overall training time. We can also observe that the corpus size and the length of sequences
both affect the training time. Since the total number of input pairs is the same for different
datasets, the corpus size becomes the main factor that impacts the overall training time. For
instance, the corpus size in D7 is smaller and with shorter sequences, the training time is
shorter than other datasets. Figure 51 studies how the size of training dataset (the number
of input training pairs) affects the training time for the three variations. In general, training
time increases when the size of the dataset increases. The longest time needed for training
the largest dataset is 49 minutes per epoch in CiTts. Parallel training for both models at the













Figure 50: CiT efficiency study: Training Time. The results are obtained based on LSTM


















Figure 51: CiT efficiency study: Time vs. Training Pairs. The results are obtained based
















Figure 52: CiT efficiency study: Hidden Unit Type. The results are obtained based on





















Figure 53: CiT efficiency study: Event Embedding Dimension; The top sub-figure shows
























Figure 54: CiT efficiency study: Seq. Embedding Dimension; The top sub-figure shows
the results from D9 dataset, and the bottom sub-figure shows the results from D10 dataset.
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The training time for other hyperparameters, network hidden layer types, event embed-
ding dimensions, and sequences embedding dimensions are shown in Figure 52, Figure 53,
and Figure 54, respectively. We observe that LSTM requires longer training time than GRU
and RNN due to its complexity (which also helps achieve better accuracy). The training
time also increases linearly with both event (Em) and sequence embedding (U) dimensions,
as presented in Figure 53 and Figure 54. This is expected as the number of embedding di-
mensions increases the increased complexity leading to a higher training time. As observed
in Chapter 5.2.8, we can achieve a good model with 20 epochs of training. The overall train-
ing time is approximately three and half hours (= 11 * 20/60) for obtaining a good CiTts
model with 50,000 training pairs. Since model training is a one-time effort and retraining
of the models only happens after major changes or upgrades to the platform, we conclude
our solution is scalable. Notably, we perform all the training on a server without GPUs and
utilizing GPUs could significantly reduce the training time [6, 79].
Testing Time
We investigate the testing time of CiT for both translation and inconsistency detection.
Figure 55a shows the translation time required for each dataset. As a general trend, longer
sequences naturally require longer translation time; however, our results show that even
the longest sequence only takes 0.12s to finish translation. In Figure 55b, we evaluate the
execution time of similarity score calculation versus the number of input event sequences
by testing the trained CiTs model with pairwise input sequences. In the zoomed in chart
inside Figure 55b, we can observe the detection time is around 4ms for a single event se-
quence pair input. Furthermore, the detection model only takes 1.5s to calculate similarity
scores for 10,000 pairs of inputs. In contrast, according to our real-world data, a user-level
operation would take OpenStack around 77 seconds on average to execute in a real cloud.

























































(b) CiT detection time




6.1 Additional Use Cases
Besides inconsistency detection, the translation capability of CiT can be applied to other
use cases. First, as CiT performs event-based detection, it can be leveraged for attack pre-
vention at runtime, e.g., integrating with a WSGI middleware [104] (or similar middleware
supports, e.g., Amazon Lambda Function [2], Google Cloud Metrics [29], and Azure Event
Grid [52]) to intercept and deny events that would cause inconsistencies. Our efficiency
results for detection (Chapter 5.2.9) demonstrate the feasibility of this use case. Second,
using CiTtm and CiTts (discussed in Chapter 4.6), we can translate VNF (e.g., Tacker)-level
events to the lower levels, even before the actual events are triggered at those lower levels.
This will enable us to proactively watch for (and deny) anomalous events without introduc-
ing extra delay. Third, CiT may help when data access is limited. As an NFV stack may
involve multiple providers or domains, a user may not be allowed to access all the lower-
level events and deployment details, which may be needed, e.g., for security verification,
resource allocation verification, or network service compliance verification purposes [100].
In such cases, CiTtm and CiTts can be utilized to translate the available events at a higher
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level into the corresponding lower level events to facilitate those tasks (given that potential
inconsistencies are not an issue). Alternatively, the lower-level providers may also translate
their events into a higher level to share with the users.
6.2 Feasibility of Training
A well-known challenge faced by machine learning-based security solutions is to gather
attack-free data for training. As shown in Chapter 5.2.7, the CiT models trained using
data collected from our experimental testbed provided satisfactory results when tested on
data from a completely different, real-world system. Such results confirm the feasibility
of training CiT under a controlled environment and then applying it to a real-world NFV
system (the training system could be made more similar to the real system than in our case,
which will further improve the accuracy).
6.3 Employing Attention-based Translation Mechanisms
As shown in Chapter 5.2.1, CiT is not limited to any specific NMT implementation. It is
possible to use other NMT mechanisms, such as RNN or attention [101], with CiT to detect
inconsistencies. There exist several attention-based Seq2Seq translation mechanisms, such
as the Transformer [101], Transformer-XL [12], BERT [13], and Reformer [39], which
have proved to outperform RNN-based translation mechanisms in NMT. Our preliminary
study with Transformer shows its potential to provide better accuracy than LSTM; however,
it is significantly slower (∼10 times) than LSTM, and hence we adopt LSTM in this work
and will investigate Transformer in future work.
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6.4 Adapting to other NFV Platforms
CiT can potentially be adapted to other NFV platforms (e.g., OSM [78] and OPNFV [77])
for inconsistency detection, since it has been designed based on the generic NFV archi-
tecture and deployment model. Most of the modules of CiT are platform agnostic except,
as a one-time effort, the data processing module needs to be adjusted to extract platform
specific event sequences through integration with either a generic middleware or logging
system (e.g., syslog).
6.5 Limitations
The main limitations of our work are as follows. First, since CiT relies on the provider for
collecting event sequences, how to ensure the integrity of such data (e.g., through trusted
computing techniques) is a future direction. Second, CiT currently relies on the access to
events at different levels, and anonymizing such events to avoid privacy concerns while
still allowing the translation and detection is an interesting challenge. Finally, we have not
considered potential adversarial attacks on the machine learning algorithms, and addressing




This chapter reviews existing approaches to NFV modeling, NFV security, anomaly detec-
tion, and translation-based security solutions, and compares them to this thesis.
7.1 NFV Models
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work proposing a concrete model for the
deployment aspects of NFV. A few other models of NFV architecture are proposed for dif-
ferent use cases, e.g., mobile edge computing in 5G [22] and efficient VNF placement [54].
Pattaranantakul et al. [82] propose a framework to dynamically manage security functions
in NFV. Hoang et al. [31] propose an extended NFV architecture that uses Tacker to support
containers.
7.2 NFV Security
Unlike our work, which focuses on the inconsistencies, most existing studies on NFV se-
curity [26, 41, 83, 110] focus on issues related to virtualization. Lal et al. [41] propose to
adapt several well-known best practices like VM separation, hypervisor introspection, and
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remote attestation. Pattaranantakul et al. [83] adopt best practices like access control to
address virtualization-related threats in NFV.
Most existing solutions in NFV that are related to inconsistency attacks (e.g., [25, 27,
50, 99, 102, 113, 114]) verify the NFVI-level configuration information (e.g., flow rues and
flow classifier) while focusing on one particular level (mostly SFC). Particularly, Chain-
Guard [27] and SFC-Checker [99] both verify the correct forwarding behavior of SFCs.
Moreover, vSFC [113] checks for a wide range of SFC violations (e.g., packet injection
attacks, flow dropping, and path non-compliance). Additionally, there exist some works
(e.g., [25, 50, 102, 114]) on verifying the functionality and performance of SFCs. For in-
stance, vNFO [25] and SLAVerifier [114] verify a wide-range of SFC functionalities (e.g.,
performance and accounting). Guido et al. [50] propose an approach for generating optimal
placement of SFCs based on given performance parameters (e.g., latency and CPU cycles)
and reachability policies. Wang et al. [102] propose a framework to automatically detect
the dependencies and conflicts between network functions. Unlike those approaches which
rely on configurations, CiT is an event-based approach which means it can potentially catch
an attack before it incurs any damage.
7.3 Anomaly Detection on Sequential Data
There exist many works (e.g., [7, 16, 36, 85, 93, 105]) that conduct anomaly detection on
sequential data (e.g., event logs, credit card transactions, and network traffic). Particularly,
DeepLog [16] and Brown et al. [7] both leverage RNNs to detect anomalies in system logs.
Also, Tiresias [93] utilizes RNNs to build a predictive model to detect future anomalies.
Jurgovsky et al. [36] use the LSTM-based sequence classification to detect anomalies in
credit card transactions. Radford et al. [85] propose a network traffic anomaly detection
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solution by utilizing LSTM to learn and predict communications between two IPs. Simi-
larly, Xiao et al. [105] utilize the semantic information of system call sequences for Android
malware detection. Besides focusing on a different context (NFV), CiT applies the addi-
tional translation step before detection, which outperforms traditional anomaly detection
(see Chapter 5.2.6).
7.4 Translation-based Security Approaches
Most of the existing security solutions that leverage neural machine translation (e.g., [15,
51, 105, 108, 115]) focus on binary code analysis, e.g., to support multiple hardware archi-
tectures like x86 and ARM. In particular, SAFE [51] leverages GRU RNN [10] and learns
function embedding automatically where each assembly instruction is considered as a word
and each sequence of instructions as a sentence. To find similar functions from binary code,
INNEREYE [115] leverages LSTM and considers assembly instruction with its operands
as a single word and the basic block as a sentence. Xu et al. [108] and Asm2vec [15] apply
neural networks to translate binaries for code similarity detection. Although in a different
context, those works show the potential of applying neural machine translation to security,
and have inspired us for our work.
In summary, this is the first work proposing a concrete model for the deployment aspects
of NFV. Furthermore, though inspired by those existing works, CiT differs from them





During this master thesis study, we also contributed to other projects as follows.
8.1 NFVGuard: Verifying the Security of Multilevel Net-
work Functions Virtualization (NFV) Stack
Network functions virtualization (NFV) enables agile and cost-effective deployment of
multi-tenant network services on top of a cloud infrastructure. However, the multi-tenant
and multilevel nature of NFV may lead to novel security challenges, such as stealthy at-
tacks exploiting potential inconsistencies be- tween different levels of the NFV stacks.
Consequently, the secu- rity compliance of a multilevel NFV stack cannot be sufficiently
established using existing solutions, which typically focus on one level. Moreover, the
naive approach of separately verifying every level could be expensive or even infeasible.
In this work, we propose, NFVGuard, the first multilevel approach to the formal security
verification of NFV stacks. Our key idea is to conduct the security verification at only one
level, and then assure that verification result for other levels by verifying the consistency
between adjacent levels. We implement NFVGuard based on our OpenStack/Tacker NFV
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testbed, and experimentally evaluate its efficiency using both real and synthetic data.
The following lists the contributions to this research work towards the NFV data gen-
eration task.
- Developed a Java program for generating valid VNFFG descriptors which are be
used to deploy VNFFGs.
- Developed bash scripts for automatically deploying a number of VNFs and VNF-
FGDs.
- Generated synthetic data for experiments using the NFV testbed.
- Assisted with writing the NFV data generation and its related challenges in the paper.
This research work is currently submitted to CloudCom’20.
8.2 NFV Testbed Deployment
Deployed and actively maintained the NFV testbed (See Chapter 5.1) which is used by
other NFV research projects. This chapter details the challenges encountered during the
implementation of the NFV testbed.
8.2.1 Implementation Challenges
- Need for manual efforts We utilized official OpenStack installation scripts [69] to
implement the services required for the NFV testbed. The scripts stopped unexpect-
edly during the installation of services like Mistral and Barbican (dependencies for
OpenStack Tacker) where inputs had to be provided during runtime. The services
were manually installed.
88
- Service version mismatch A basic NFV implementation requires at least 14 Open-
Stack services operating together as a stack. But a version mismatch among services
can cause the entire NFV deployment to collapse, and the troubleshooting becomes
very challenging.
- Conflicting service dependencies The services involved in the NFV stack require de-
pendencies which sometimes cause conflicts between each other during installation.
We used Python virtual environments to keep the service dependencies independent
from another.
- Faulty quota management During the large-scale deployment process where thou-
sands of VNFs and VNFFGs need to be created, the tenants’ resource quota alloca-
tion has to be adjusted. We were not able to update the resource quota of networking-
sfc [76] component which is responsible for chaining VNFs. We were able to create
only 10 VNFFGs per tenant. Hence, we increased the number of projects in order to
be able to create more VNFFGs.
- Undocumented deployment constraints We developed Python and Java programs to
automate the deployment of VNFs and VNFFGs by generating their corresponding
descriptors. During the deployment, we faced constraints which are not officially
documented thus resulting in deployment failures, such as (i) unable to chain VNFs
with their management ports, (ii) unable to chain VNFs from different subnets, and
(iii) the network traffic source must be within the same subnet as the VNFs. We vali-
dated all the generated VNFFG descriptors based on these constraints for a successful
deployment.
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Figure 56: The topology view of VNFs implemented in our NFV tested from Horizon [66]
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Chapter 9
Future Work and Conclusion
9.1 Future Work
As future work, in addition to formalizing the proposed NFV deployment model, we will
extend our network-centric model to include other computing or storage managerial com-
ponents. Furthermore, we intend to develop security verification tools based on open source
NFV environments. We will also investigate the possibility of utilizing attention-based
translation methodologies such as Transformer, BERT and Transformer-XL to further im-
prove the performance and efficiency of CiT. Furthermore, we will also further enhance
CiT to overcome its current limitations. For instance, since the results of the detection sys-
tem entirely depends upon the quality of the datasets used, we would like to evaluate the




In this thesis, we presented a multilevel NFV deployment model, which complements the
ETSI architecture with essential details for exploring potential inconsistency vulnerabili-
ties in NFV. Our model showed that the autonomous management components at differ-
ent levels render cross-level inconsistencies an intrinsic threat to NFV. We validated our
model by implementing an NFV testbed and concrete attack scenarios. Our study on the
data collection paved the way for developing verification-based detection solution. Fur-
thermore, we have proposed an event-based, Neural Machine Translation (NMT)-powered
detection approach, namely, CiT, for cross-level inconsistency attacks in NFV. Specifically,
we have leveraged the Long Short-term Memory (LSTM) model to translate the event se-
quences between different levels of an NFV stack. We have applied both similarity metric
and Siamese neural network to compare the translated event sequences with the actual se-
quences to detect inconsistency attacks. As a proof of concept, we have integrated CiT into
OpenStack/Tacker and conducted extensive experiments using both real and synthetic data
to demonstrate the efficiency, accuracy, and robustness of our solution.
92
Bibliography
[1] C. C. Aggarwal, A. Hinneburg, and D. A. Keim. On the surprising behavior of
distance metrics in high dimensional space. In International conference on database
theory, pages 420–434. Springer, 2001.
[2] Amazon. AWS Lambda Features, 2020. Available at: https://aws.amazon.
com/lambda/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[3] Y. Bengio, P. Simard, and P. Frasconi. Learning long-term dependencies with gradi-
ent descent is difficult. IEEE transactions on neural networks, 5(2):157–166, 1994.
[4] S. Bleikertz, C. Vogel, T. Groß, and S. Mödersheim. Proactive security analysis of
changes in virtualized infrastructures. In Proceedings of the 31st annual computer
security applications conference, pages 51–60, 2015.
[5] P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, A. Joulin, and T. Mikolov. Enriching word vectors with
subword information. Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguis-
tics, 5:135–146, 2017.
[6] D. Britz, A. Goldie, M.-T. Luong, and Q. Le. Massive exploration of neural machine
translation architectures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.03906, 2017.
[7] A. Brown, A. Tuor, B. Hutchinson, and N. Nichols. Recurrent neural network atten-
tion mechanisms for interpretable system log anomaly detection. In Proceedings of
the First Workshop on Machine Learning for Computing Systems, pages 1–8, 2018.
[8] R. Caruana, S. Lawrence, and C. L. Giles. Overfitting in neural nets: Backpropa-
gation, conjugate gradient, and early stopping. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 402–408, 2001.
[9] K. Chen, Z. Zhang, J. Long, and H. Zhang. Turning from TF-IDF to TF-IGM for
term weighting in text classification. Expert Systems with Applications, 66:245–260,
2016.
[10] K. Cho, B. Van Merriënboer, C. Gulcehre, D. Bahdanau, F. Bougares, H. Schwenk,
and Y. Bengio. Learning phrase representations using RNN encoder-decoder for
statistical machine translation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1078, 2014.
93
[11] M. Creutz, T. Hirsimäki, M. Kurimo, A. Puurula, J. Pylkkönen, V. Siivola, M. Var-
jokallio, E. Arisoy, M. Saraçlar, and A. Stolcke. Morph-based speech recognition
and modeling of out-of-vocabulary words across languages. ACM Transactions on
Speech and Language Processing (TSLP), 5(1):1–29, 2007.
[12] Z. Dai, Z. Yang, Y. Yang, J. Carbonell, Q. V. Le, and R. Salakhutdinov. Transformer-
xl: Attentive language models beyond a fixed-length context. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1901.02860, 2019.
[13] J. Devlin, M.-W. Chang, K. Lee, and K. Toutanova. Bert: Pre-training of
deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.04805, 2018.
[14] R. Dey and F. M. Salemt. Gate-variants of gated recurrent unit (gru) neural net-
works. In 2017 IEEE 60th international midwest symposium on circuits and systems
(MWSCAS), pages 1597–1600. IEEE, 2017.
[15] S. H. Ding, B. C. Fung, and P. Charland. Asm2vec: Boosting static representation
robustness for binary clone search against code obfuscation and compiler optimiza-
tion. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 472–489. IEEE,
2019.
[16] M. Du, F. Li, G. Zheng, and V. Srikumar. Deeplog: Anomaly detection and diagnosis
from system logs through deep learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 1285–1298,
2017.
[17] ETSI. ETSI. https://www.etsi.org/.
[18] ETSI. Network functions virtualisation - Use cases, 2013.
[19] ETSI. Network functions virtualisation architectural framework, 2013.
[20] ETSI. Network functions virtualisation - Report on SDN usage in NFV architectural
framework, 2015.
[21] ETSI. Network function virtualisation (NFV); Reliability; Report on the resilience
of NFV-MANO critical capabilities, 2017.
[22] ETSI. MEC in 5G networks, 2018.
[23] ETSI. Network functions virtualisation (NFV) release 3; Management and orches-
tration; Architecture enhancement for security management specification, 2018.
[24] I. Farris, T. Taleb, Y. Khettab, and J. Song. A survey on emerging sdn and nfv
security mechanisms for iot systems. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
21(1):812–837, 2018.
94
[25] S. K. Fayazbakhsh, M. K. Reiter, and V. Sekar. Verifiable network function outsourc-
ing: requirements, challenges, and roadmap. In Proceedings of the workshop on Hot
topics in middleboxes and network function virtualization, pages 25–30, 2013.
[26] M. D. Firoozjaei, J. P. Jeong, H. Ko, and H. Kim. Security challenges with network
functions virtualization. Future Generation Computer Systems, 67:315–324, 2017.
[27] M. Flittner, J. M. Scheuermann, and R. Bauer. ChainGuard: Controller-independent
verification of service function chaining in cloud computing. In 2017 IEEE Con-
ference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks (NFV-
SDN), pages 1–7. IEEE, 2017.
[28] G. Gardikis, K. Tzoulas, K. Tripolitis, A. Bartzas, S. Costicoglou, A. Lioy, B. Gas-
ton, C. Fernandez, C. Davila, A. Litke, et al. SHIELD: A novel NFV-based cyberse-
curity framework. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft),
pages 1–6. IEEE, 2017.
[29] Google. Google Cloud metrics, 2020.
[30] B. Han, V. Gopalakrishnan, L. Ji, and S. Lee. Network function virtualization:
Challenges and opportunities for innovations. IEEE Communications Magazine,
53(2):90–97, 2015.
[31] C.-P. Hoang, N.-T. Dinh, and Y. Kim. An extended virtual network functions man-
ager architecture to support container. In ICISS’18, pages 173–176, 2018.
[32] S. Hochreiter and J. Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory. Neural computation,
9(8):1735–1780, 1997.
[33] S. Hong, L. Xu, H. Wang, and G. Gu. Poisoning network visibility in software-
defined networks: New attacks and countermeasures. In NDSS’15, pages 8–11,
2015.
[34] G. M. Insights. Network function virtualization (NFV) market size, 2020. Available
at: https://www.gminsights.com/industry-analysis/network-
function-virtualization-nfv-market, last accessed on: July 23, 2020.
[35] Intel. Realising the benefits of network functions virtualisation in telecoms
networks, 2014. Available at: https://www.intel.com/content/
dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/benefits-
network-functions-virtualization-telecoms-paper.pdf, last
accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[36] J. Jurgovsky, M. Granitzer, K. Ziegler, S. Calabretto, P.-E. Portier, L. He-Guelton,
and O. Caelen. Sequence classification for credit-card fraud detection. Expert Sys-
tems with Applications, 100:234–245, 2018.
95
[37] Keras. Keras: The Python Deep Learning library. Available at: https://keras.
io/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[38] A. Khurshid, X. Zou, W. Zhou, M. Caesar, and P. B. Godfrey. Veriflow: Verifying
network-wide invariants in real time. In NSDI’13, pages 15–27, 2013.
[39] N. Kitaev, Ł. Kaiser, and A. Levskaya. Reformer: The efficient transformer. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2001.04451, 2020.
[40] S. M. Lakew, M. Cettolo, and M. Federico. A comparison of transformer and re-
current neural networks on multilingual neural machine translation. In Proceedings
of the 27th International Conference on Computational Linguistics, pages 641–652,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA, Aug. 2018. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
[41] S. Lal, T. Taleb, and A. Dutta. NFV: Security threats and best practices. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 55(8):211–217, 2017.
[42] O. Levy and Y. Goldberg. Neural word embedding as implicit matrix factorization.
In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 2177–2185, 2014.
[43] B. Li and L. Han. Distance weighted cosine similarity measure for text classifica-
tion. In International Conference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated
Learning, pages 611–618. Springer, 2013.
[44] N. P. Lopes, N. Bjørner, P. Godefroid, K. Jayaraman, and G. Varghese. Checking
beliefs in dynamic networks. In NSDI’15, pages 499–512, 2015.
[45] L. v. d. Maaten and G. Hinton. Visualizing data using t-SNE. Journal of machine
learning research, 9(Nov):2579–2605, 2008.
[46] T. Madi, Y. Jarraya, A. Alimohammadifar, S. Majumdar, Y. Wang, M. Pourzandi,
L. Wang, and M. Debbabi. ISOTOP: Auditing virtual networks isolation across
cloud layers in openstack. ACM TOPS, 22(1):1:1–1:35, 2018.
[47] T. Madi, Y. Jarraya, A. Alimohammadifar, S. Majumdar, Y. Wang, M. Pourzandi,
L. Wang, and M. Debbabi. ISOTOP: auditing virtual networks isolation across cloud
layers in OpenStack. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), 22(1):1–
35, 2018.
[48] T. Madi, S. Majumdar, Y. Wang, Y. Jarraya, M. Pourzandi, and L. Wang. Auditing
security compliance of the virtualized infrastructure in the cloud: Application to
OpenStack. In Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application
Security and Privacy, pages 195–206, 2016.
[49] P. Malhotra, A. Ramakrishnan, G. Anand, L. Vig, P. Agarwal, and G. Shroff.
LSTM-based encoder-decoder for multi-sensor anomaly detection. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.00148, 2016.
96
[50] G. Marchetto, R. Sisto, J. Yusupov, and A. Ksentini. Virtual network embedding
with formal reachability assurance. In CNSM, 2018.
[51] L. Massarelli, G. A. Di Luna, F. Petroni, R. Baldoni, and L. Querzoni. Safe: Self-
attentive function embeddings for binary similarity. In International Conference on
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, pages 309–329.
Springer, 2019.
[52] Microsoft. Azure Event Grid, 2020. Available at: https://azure.
microsoft.com/en-us/services/event-grid/, last accessed on: July
24, 2020.
[53] T. Mikolov, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean. Efficient estimation of word repre-
sentations in vector space. arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.3781, 2013.
[54] H. Moens and F. De Turck. VNF-P: A model for efficient placement of virtualized
network functions. In CNSM’14, pages 418–423, 2014.
[55] J. Mueller and A. Thyagarajan. Siamese recurrent architectures for learning sentence
similarity. In thirtieth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, 2016.
[56] National Institute of Standards and Technology. CVE-2015-3456 Detail, 2015.
Available at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3456,
last accessed on: April 17, 2020.
[57] National Institute of Standards and Technology. CVE-2015-7835 Detail, 2015.
Available at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7835,
last accessed on: April 17, 2020.
[58] National Institute of Standards and Technology. CVE-2018-10853 Detail,
2018. Available at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-
10853, last accessed on: April 17, 2020.
[59] NIST. The NIST definition of cloud computing, 2011.
[60] Oasis. Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Applications (TOSCA),
2013. Available at: https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/
tosca/, last accessed on: July 30, 2020.
[61] ONAP. Open Network Automation Platform. Available at: https://www.
onap.org/.
[62] OpenDaylight. OpenDaylight Project. Available at: https://www.
opendaylight.org/.
[63] OpenDaylight. CVE-2018-1078: OpenDaylight - Insecure behavior in node recon-
ciliation process, 2018.
97
[64] OpenStack. OpenStack. Available at: https://www.openstack.org/, last
accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[65] OpenStack. OpenStack Heat. Available at: https://docs.openstack.org/
heat/latest/.
[66] OpenStack. OpenStack Horizon. Available at: https://docs.openstack.
org/horizon/latest/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[67] OpenStack. OpenStack Neutron. Available at: https://docs.openstack.
org/neutron/latest/.
[68] OpenStack. Openstack security advisories. Available at: https://security.
openstack.org/ossalist.html.
[69] OpenStack. OpenStack Training Labs. Available at: https://docs.
openstack.org/training_labs/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[70] OpenStack. OpenStack Congress, 2015. Available at: https://wiki.
openstack.org/wiki/Congress, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[71] OpenStack. Stack update failed: port still in use, 2015. Available at: https:
//bugs.launchpad.net/heat/+bug/1517355, last accessed on: July 23,
2020.
[72] OpenStack. Cinder fails to create volume with gateway time-out error under high
load, 2016. Available at: https://bugs.launchpad.net/mos/+bug/
1653164, last accessed on: July 23, 2020.
[73] OpenStack. Heavy reading study on CSPs and OpenStack, 2016.
[74] OpenStack. Rule:shared is not respected in port/subnet create, 2018. Available
at: https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1808112, last ac-
cessed on: July 23, 2020.
[75] OpenStack. User is not allowed to create port with fixed IP on shared network
via RBAC, 2019. Available at: https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/
+bug/1833455, last accessed on: July 23, 2020.
[76] OpenStack Networking-SFC. OpenStack Networking: Service Function Chain-
ing. Available at: https://docs.openstack.org/networking-sfc/
latest/, last accessed on: August 09, 2020.
[77] OPNFV. OPNFV. Available at: https://www.opnfv.org/, last accessed on:
July 24, 2020.
[78] OSM. Open source MANO. Available at: https://osm.etsi.org/, last ac-
cessed on: July 24, 2020.
98
[79] M. Ott, S. Edunov, D. Grangier, and M. Auli. Scaling neural machine translation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.00187, 2018.
[80] Ovum. NFV deployments still on the rise, 2020. Available at: https:
//www.omdia.com/resources/product-content/ovum-survey-
results-on-nfv-adoption-spt002-000284, last accessed on: April 12,
2020.
[81] pandas. pandas - Python Data Analysis Library. Available at: https://pandas.
pydata.org/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[82] M. Pattaranantakul, R. He, A. Meddahi, and Z. Zhang. SecMANO: Towards network
functions virtualization NFV based security management and orchestration. In IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, pages 598–605, 2016.
[83] M. Pattaranantakul, R. He, Q. Song, Z. Zhang, and A. Meddahi. NFV security
survey: From use case driven threat analysis to State-of-the-art countermeasures.
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 20(4):3330–3368, 2018.
[84] J. Pennington, R. Socher, and C. D. Manning. Glove: Global vectors for word rep-
resentation. In Proceedings of the 2014 conference on empirical methods in natural
language processing (EMNLP), pages 1532–1543, 2014.
[85] B. J. Radford, L. M. Apolonio, A. J. Trias, and J. A. Simpson. Net-
work traffic anomaly detection using recurrent neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.10769, 2018.
[86] J. Ramos et al. Using TF-IDF to determine word relevance in document queries. In
Proceedings of the first instructional conference on machine learning, volume 242,
pages 133–142. New Jersey, USA, 2003.
[87] RedHat. The year of open source networking for CSPs, 2018. Available
at: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/2018-year-open-source-
networking-csps.
[88] R. Rehurek and P. Sojka. Gensim—statistical semantics in Python. Retrieved from
genism. org, 2011.
[89] N. Reimers and I. Gurevych. Optimal hyperparameters for deep LSTM-networks
for sequence labeling tasks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.06799, 2017.
[90] F. Reynaud, F.-X. Aguessy, O. Bettan, M. Bouet, and V. Conan. Attacks against
network functions virtualization and software-defined networking: State-of-the-art.
In 2016 IEEE NetSoft Conference and Workshops (NetSoft), pages 471–476. IEEE,
2016.
[91] C. Sammut and G. I. Webb, editors. Encyclopedia of Machine Learning and Data
Mining. Springer, 2017.
99
[92] scikitlearn. scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python. Available at: https://
scikit-learn.org/stable/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[93] Y. Shen, E. Mariconti, P. A. Vervier, and G. Stringhini. Tiresias: Predicting security
events through deep learning. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 592–605, 2018.
[94] M.-K. Shin, Y. Choi, H. H. Kwak, S. Pack, M. Kang, and J.-Y. Choi. Verification for
NFV-enabled network services. In 2015 International Conference on Information
and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), pages 810–815. IEEE, 2015.
[95] S. W. Shin and G. Gu. Attacking software-defined networks: A first feasibility study.
In HotSDN’13, pages 165–166, 2013.
[96] L. T. Sudershan, M. Zhang, A. Oqaily, G. S. Chawla, L. Wang, M. Pourzandi, and
M. Debbabi. Modeling NFV deployment to identify the cross-level inconsistency
vulnerabilities. In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Tech-
nology and Science (CloudCom), pages 167–174. IEEE, 2019.
[97] I. Sutskever, O. Vinyals, and Q. V. Le. Sequence to sequence learning with neural
networks. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 3104–3112,
2014.
[98] Tacker. OpenStack Tacker. Available at: https://wiki.openstack.org/
wiki/Tacker, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
[99] B. Tschaen, Y. Zhang, T. Benson, S. Banerjee, J. Lee, and J.-M. Kang. Sfc-checker:
Checking the correct forwarding behavior of service function chaining. In 2016
IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Net-
works (NFV-SDN), pages 134–140. IEEE, 2016.
[100] P. Twamley, M. Müller, P.-B. Bök, G. K. Xilouris, C. Sakkas, M. A. Kourtis,
M. Peuster, S. Schneider, P. Stavrianos, and D. Kyriazis. 5GTANGO: An approach
for testing nfv deployments. In 2018 European Conference on Networks and Com-
munications (EuCNC), pages 1–218. IEEE, 2018.
[101] A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit, L. Jones, A. N. Gomez, Ł. Kaiser,
and I. Polosukhin. Attention is all you need. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 5998–6008, 2017.
[102] Y. Wang, Z. Li, G. Xie, and K. Salamatian. Enabling automatic composition and
verification of service function chain. In 2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Sym-
posium on Quality of Service (IWQoS), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2017.
[103] WordNet. WordNet: a lexical database for English. Available at:https://
wordnet.princeton.edu/, last accessed on: July 24, 2020.
100
[104] WSGI. Middleware and libraries for WSGI, 2016. Available at:
http://wsgi.readthedocs.io/en/latest/libraries.html, last accessed on: February 15,
2020.
[105] X. Xiao, S. Zhang, F. Mercaldo, G. Hu, and A. K. Sangaiah. Android malware detec-
tion based on system call sequences and lstm. Multimedia Tools and Applications,
78(4):3979–3999, 2019.
[106] Z. Xing, J. Pei, and E. Keogh. A brief survey on sequence classification. ACM
Sigkdd Explorations Newsletter, 12(1):40–48, 2010.
[107] L. Xu, J. Huang, S. Hong, J. Zhang, and G. Gu. Attacking the brain: Races in the
SDN control plane. In USENIX Security’17, pages 451–468, 2017.
[108] X. Xu, C. Liu, Q. Feng, H. Yin, L. Song, and D. Song. Neural network-based graph
embedding for cross-platform binary code similarity detection. In Proceedings of the
2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS),
pages 363–376, 2017.
[109] Y. Xu, Y. Liu, R. Singh, and S. Tao. Identifying SDN state inconsistency in Open-
Stack. In SOSR’15, page 11, 2015.
[110] W. Yang and C. Fung. A survey on security in network functions virtualization. In
2016 IEEE NetSoft Conference and Workshops (NetSoft), pages 15–19. IEEE, 2016.
[111] W.-t. Yih, K. Toutanova, J. C. Platt, and C. Meek. Learning discriminative pro-
jections for text similarity measures. In Proceedings of the fifteenth conference on
computational natural language learning, pages 247–256, 2011.
[112] F. Z. Yousaf, M. Bredel, S. Schaller, and F. Schneider. NFV and SDN—key technol-
ogy enablers for 5G networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
35(11):2468–2478, 2017.
[113] X. Zhang, Q. Li, J. Wu, and J. Yang. Generic and agile service function chain
verification on cloud. In 2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality
of Service (IWQoS), pages 1–10, 2017.
[114] Y. Zhang, W. Wu, S. Banerjee, J.-M. Kang, and M. A. Sanchez. SLA-verifier: State-
ful and quantitative verification for service chaining. In INFOCOM, 2017.
[115] F. Zuo, X. Li, P. Young, L. Luo, Q. Zeng, and Z. Zhang. Neural machine translation
inspired binary code similarity comparison beyond function pairs. In Network and
Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium, 2019.
101
